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NOTES

Finding a Better Analogy for the Right
of Publicity
INTRODUCTION
The right of publicity is the simple idea that there “is
[an] inherent right of every human being to control the
commercial use of his or her identity.”1 Although conceptually
straightforward, it has been the subject of significant
commentary and debate.2 Neither courts nor scholars have
accepted a uniform theoretical foundation for the right of
publicity.3 Consequently, it has developed into a disjointed
doctrine.4 Scholars invariably analogize to more grounded
concepts in an attempt to rationalize and set limits on the
right.5 When either justifying the right of publicity’s existence
or resolving a doctrinal issue, writers have argued that the
right of publicity should mirror copyright law,6 trademark law,7

1

1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d

ed. 2011).
2

See, e.g., K.J. Greene, Intellectual Property Expansion: The Good, the Bad,
and the Right of Publicity, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 521, 521 (2008) (“Is there really anything
left to say about this topic, given the proliferation of writing on it in the last ten to
fifteen years? A lot has been said about the right of publicity, most of it negative.”).
3
See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture
and Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 238 (1993) (“[T]he affirmative case for
publicity rights is at best an uneasy one. Individually and cumulatively, the standard
justifications are not nearly as compelling as is commonly supposed.”).
4
See Eric J. Goodman, A National Identity Crisis: The Need for a Federal
Right of Publicity Statute, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 227, 228 (1999).
5
See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity
Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1163-64 (2006) (“This
approach turns the right of publicity into a new form of IP right, one based explicitly on
analogies to and justifications for real property. Thinking about the right of publicity
by analogy to IP law may indeed be helpful.”).
6
Randall T.E. Coyne, Toward a Modified Fair Use Defense in the Right of
Publicity Cases, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 781, 782 (1988) (arguing that the right of
publicity should be structured in the same manner as the fair use doctrine under
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or trademark dilution.8 Using tools from other academic
disciplines, other scholars have argued for or against the right
of publicity.9 Indeed, whenever scholars encounter the right of
publicity, their first instinct is to compare it to something else.
While these analogies often provide novel and insightful
critiques, the commentaries often ignore the significant
differences between whatever perspective they are arguing
from and the right of publicity. Indeed, at least one
commentator has noted that legal issues created by the right of
publicity cannot be resolved by “automatic invocation of a
ready-made framework.”10 One analogy that has been
overlooked, which parallels the right of publicity and is far
more practical than others frequently offered, is private
contracting in the commercial and entertainment industries. In
many ways, comparing this sort of private contracting is not an
analogy at all, but a reference to business custom. Industry
collective bargaining agreements protect similar interests as the
right of publicity, and operate in many of the same ways.11
Specifically, both the right of publicity and entertainment
collective bargaining agreements developed out of the same
social and technological changes.12 Collective bargaining
agreements confer rights—the most important of which is the
right to residual compensation13—to actors and performers to
control and compensate those individuals for use of their
personas within the contractual relationship.14 The right of
publicity ensures individuals’ control of their personas from the
world at large.15 The one discernible difference between collective
bargaining and violations of the right of publicity is that the

copyright law); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning for the Right
of Publicity?, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 191, 192 (1983) (same).
7
See generally Dogan & Lemley, supra note 5.
8
See generally Sarah M. Konsky, Publicity Dilution: A Proposal for
Protecting Publicity Rights, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 347 (2004).
9
See generally Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right
of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383, 411-30 (1999) (arguing that the theories of Immanuel
Kant justify the right of publicity); Madow, supra note 3 (arguing from a Cultural
Studies perspective).
10
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment:
A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 62 (1994).
11
See infra Part II.B.
12
See infra Part I.
13
See infra notes 203-09 and accompanying text.
14
See infra notes 198-204 and accompanying text.
15
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:3.
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usage in contracts is with consent of the individual and usage
that violates the right of publicity is without consent.16
This note suggests a new method to analyze the right of
publicity. Voluntary contracts within the entertainment
industry provide an analytical tool to assess both the
underlying policy justifications for the right of publicity and the
doctrinal rules within it. First, in terms of an underlying
justification for the right of publicity, reference to contracts and
business practice shows that the right of publicity is not a halfbaked intellectual property right with little justification.
Rather, this analytical framework supports unjust enrichment
and natural rights theory justifications for the right of
publicity—not
labor
theory
and
diminution-in-value
justifications, as some scholars have suggested.17 Second,
contractual structure in entertainment contracts, which is an
industry standard determined through collective bargaining and
protects similar interests as the right of publicity,18 provides a
tool to analyze doctrinal rules within the right of publicity.
Comparing entertainment contracts to the right of publicity
supports extending the right of publicity to non-celebrities.19
Additionally, entertainment contracts provide lawmakers and
courts with a benchmark to determine whether unauthorized
usage of an individual’s image or persona is incidental to, and
therefore not infringing on, the right of publicity.20
Given that unions dominate the commercial and
entertainment industries,21 the most appropriate place to find
standard entertainment contracts is coordinated collective
bargaining agreements. Since right-of-publicity infringements
are most prevalent in advertising due to First Amendment
limitations,22 this note focuses primarily on the Commercial
16

Richard Goldstein & Arthur Kessler, Comment, The Twilight Zone:
Meanderings in the Areas of Performers’ Rights, 9 UCLA L. REV. 819, 819-20 (1962).
17
See infra Part III.
18
See infra Part II.
19
See infra Part IV.A.
20
See infra Part IV.B.
21
See infra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
22
See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 8:16
(2d ed. 2011) (“Today, advertising is labeled as ‘commercial speech’ which is within the
First Amendment, but it enjoys a lower level of constitutional protection than does
‘news’ or ‘entertainment.’ In some cases, its level of First Amendment protection seems
so attenuated as to be practically nonexistent.”); Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin,
Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577,
1597-99 (1979) (arguing that news and entertainment have higher levels of
constitutional protection and that commercial speech “is not regarded as being of
constitutional proportions”). However, the right of publicity can prevail against even
the strongest First Amendment interests. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad.
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Contracts between the American Federation of Television and
Radio Artists (AFTRA), Screen Actors Guild (SAG), Association
of National Advertisers (ANA), and American Association of
Advertising Agencies (AAAA). However, contractual relations
in movies, television, radio programming, and screen writing
are referenced when relevant.
Part I compares the historical development of the right of
publicity and collective bargaining in the commercial and
entertainment industries. It argues that both developed in
response to the same social and technological changes. Part II
compares the current collective bargaining and right-of-publicity
regimes. Part III analyzes the traditional justifications for the
right of publicity and suggests, with reference to the contractual
relations, that unjust enrichment and natural rights theories
best justify the right of publicity. Part IV considers several rules
within the right of publicity. First, this part argues that the
right of publicity should extend to non-celebrities. By offering
evidence that non-celebrities have commercial value when
appropriated, this part concludes that the right should extend to
all individuals. Finally, examining the incidental use doctrine
for the right of publicity, this part suggests that judges and
legislators should use analogous collective bargaining provisions
as a benchmark in formulating incidental use doctrine.
I.

THE COMMON ORIGINS

Many scholars trace the right of publicity back to the
right of privacy.23 However, more nuanced accounts recognize
that the right of publicity originated as a response to two
phenomena: a cultural shift that placed higher value on
celebrity and fame, and the inadequacy of privacy rights in
protecting celebrity rights.24 The increased value of celebrity
Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977) (holding that news broadcast infringed on a performer’s
right of publicity by televising his entire act).
23
Most of these accounts begin with Samuel D. Warren and Louis Brandeis’s
famous law review article The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 (1890), in
which they argued for a new common law right that protected an individual’s privacy.
See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 5, at 1167-68; Seth A. Dymond, Comment, So
Many Entertainers, So Little Protection: New York, The Right of Publicity, and the Need
for Reciprocity, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 447, 449 (2003); Alicia M. Hunt, Comment,
Everyone Wants to Be a Star: Extensive Publicity Rights for Noncelebrities Unduly
Restrict Commercial Speech, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1605, 1612 (2001).
24
See, e.g., Madow, supra note 3, at 167 (“The right of publicity was created
not so much from the right of privacy as from frustration with it. Moreover, . . . the
whole matter was negotiated by courts and commentators with something less than
divine ease and grace.”).
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occurred in three distinct periods. First, around the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century, society’s icons changed
from those who were known for their accomplishments—such as
inventors or political leaders—to actors and athletes.25 Second, in
the first half of the twentieth century, mass media began to
treat personality as a valuable commodity as the new celebrities
were employed for commercial gain.26 Third, in the 1950’s, with
the breakdown in the studio system and the invention of
television, actors’ images became particularly vulnerable to
misappropriation.27 As will be shown, modern collective
bargaining in the entertainment and advertising industries
derives from these same cultural shifts, which makes it the
closest set of principles to the right of publicity. Thus, it was not
the law that shaped the contractual relations here. Instead, both
developed independently out of the same cultural shifts.
A.

The Invention of Celebrity, the Commodification of
Persona, and the End of an Era
1. Cultural and Technological Shifts Lead to
Commodification of Persona

The face of fame undeniably changed from the
nineteenth to the twentieth century.28 Starting with the
Revolutionary period, society’s heroes were civic leaders.29 At
the time, merchants appropriated the founding fathers’ images
with impunity.30 According to Professor Michael Madow, the
founders “viewed their images as a kind of common republican
property.”31 Indeed, given the treatment of public personas as
common property, famous people seemingly had no right to
prevent commercial appropriation of their image.32 Following
the Revolutionary period, from 1820 to 1860, “poets, essayists,
critics, historians, and preachers” wrote the national narrative,

25

Id. at 160-61; Amy Henderson, Media and the Rise of Celebrity Culture, OAH
MAG. OF HIST., Spring 1992, at 49, 49 (“By [the] mid-twentieth century, the pedestal
belonged not to politicians or generals, but to baseball players and movie stars.”).
26
See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
27
See infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
28
Henderson, supra note 25, at 49.
29
Id. (“Above all other figures of the Revolutionary generation, George
Washington stood as the great embodiment of national virtue, the symbol of the
fledgling nation’s essential worthiness.”).
30
Madow, supra note 3, at 148-49.
31
Id. at 150.
32
Id. at 152.
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but personas remained public property.33 Society knew the
famous more by their words or actions than by their images.34
By contrast, nineteenth-century society placed a low value on
actors and performers.35
Starting in the late nineteenth century, a new face of
fame emerged. As a result of changes in technology and
journalism,36 society’s attention focused on captains of industry
and inventors.37 Specifically, the invention of photography and
chromolithography revolutionized the reproduction of images.38
In the 1880s, modern newspapers “were made possible by highspeed presses, the linotype, halftone photo reproduction, and
the emergence of news-gathering organizations such as the
Associated Press.”39 These advancements lead to drastic
changes in journalism, which Professor Madow describes as
“genuinely pictorial or illustrated ‘personalities’ journalism.”40
Magazines and newspapers began to focus on prominent
members of society, and often printed their pictures.41
It is within this period that Samuel D. Warren and
Louis Brandeis wrote their renowned law review article on the
right of privacy.42 In response to the press’s increasing interest
in the private lives of prominent citizens43 and the widespread

33

Henderson, supra note 25, at 49; see also Madow, supra note 3, at 152
(“According to the social historian Neil Harris, commercial exploitation of famous
persons—living and dead, political and theatrical, fictional and real—was common
throughout the nineteenth century . . . .”).
34
Madow, supra note 3, at 159.
35
Id. at 226 (“A century ago actors, entertainers, and athletes were still
socially marginal and politically inconsequential.”).
36
Henderson, supra note 25, at 49-50 (explaining effects of “image
reproduction and of facilities for mass dispersion of information”). Historian Daniel
Boorstin termed the era the “Graphic Revolution.” Id. at 49; see also DANIEL J.
BOORSTIN, THE IMAGE: A GUIDE TO PSEUDO-EVENTS IN AMERICA 47 (25th Anniversary
ed., Vintage Books 1992) (1962) (describing how advances in technology create a
mechanism to manufacture celebrities’ “well-knownness”).
37
Henderson, supra note 25, at 50 (describing how society came to idolize
“hero-inventors” and “captains of industry”).
38
Id. at 49.
39
Id. at 49-50; see also Madow, supra note 3, at 157 (“The closing decades of
the nineteenth century also brought several related changes in popular journalism.
Daily newspaper circulation jumped from 2.6 million in 1870 to 8.4 million in 1890.”).
40
Madow, supra note 3, at 158.
41
See Henderson, supra note 25, at 50 (“The new magazines such as
‘McClure’s’ that appeared in the 1890s also played a role in enlarging the popular
imagination, thereby redefining ideals of fame, success, and national heroism.”); see
also Madow, supra note 3, at 159.
42
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23.
43
Id. at 196 (“To occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle
gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle.”).
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use of photographs in media,44 the authors advocated for a new
common law doctrine that guaranteed private citizens the
“right to be let alone.”45 This new right of privacy would
ostensibly prevent publishers from printing private facts about,
or photographs of, ordinary citizens.46 However, Warren and
Brandeis carefully circumscribed an exception to the rule: “The
right to privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter
which is of public or general interest.”47 This exception often
resulted in courts’ denying right-to-privacy actions for
misappropriating famous people’s professional identities, under
the theory that famous people waived their right of privacy.48
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, a
new face of fame emerged: the celebrity.49 Americans first
became fixated with the personal lives of “political leaders,
businessmen, financiers, scientists and inventors.”50 However,
by the 1920s, society’s attention shifted to “film actors,
entertainers, athletes, and the like, people who excelled in the
world of play.”51 According to historian Daniel Boorstin, society
no longer idolized men of merit who achieved status through
accomplishment; instead, Americans worshiped “celebrities,”
defined as those “who [are] known for [their] well-knownness.”52
This shift in society’s interests resulted from social changes
and technological advances.53 Foremost, dramatic alterations in
national demographics occurred because of immigration. From
1890 through the 1920s, approximately 23 million Eastern
Europeans and Italians immigrated to the United States, many

44

Id. at 195 (“Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have
invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life . . . .”).
45
Id. at 193.
46
Id. at 215 (“The general object in view is to protect the privacy of private
life, and to whatever degree and in whatever connection a man’s life has ceased to be
private, before the publication under consideration has been made, to that extent the
protection is to be withdrawn.”).
47
Id. at 214.
48
See infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
49
See Henderson, supra note 25, at 50 (describing the public’s increasing
fascination with entertainers starting in the 1880’s).
50
Madow, supra note 3, at 163 (citing LEO LOWENTHAL, The Triumph of
Mass Idols, in LITERATURE, POPULAR CULTURE, AND SOCIETY 109, 109-14 (1961)); see
also Henderson, supra note 25, at 50.
51
Madow, supra note 3, at 163.
52
BOORSTIN, supra note 36, at 57. According to Boorstin, modern celebrities
are celebrated not for their achievements, but instead for constantly being in the public
spotlight. See id. at 57-58. The creation of new celebrities is possible only through
advancements in technology, which Boorstin labels the “Graphic Revolution.” Id. at 57.
53
Henderson, supra note 25, at 50 (discussing demographic changes and
advancements in technology).
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of them settling in eastern cities.54 This demographic change
caused a cultural shift, much of which was “rooted in the
entertainment industry.”55 Additionally, rapid technological
advancement allowed mass media to expose the public to the
new celebrity56 : the radio brought the celebrities’ voices into the
nation’s homes.57 The motion picture captivated audiences and
brought people closer to the actors with close-ups,58 creating a
more personal connection not achievable in live theater.59 The
television completed the creation of the modern celebrity by
bringing the picture and sound of actors and performers into the
home, which creates “the greatest degree of intimacy and
familiarity between performers and their audiences.”60
The rise of celebrity culture became associated with a
larger sociological shift in America from a society of production
to a society of consumption.61 According to some historians,
American consumption required a new way to distinguish
people within society; “[p]ersonality became a means to
distinguish our individual selves from the mass.”62 Advertising
practices reflected consumption of personalities.63 With these
significant changes in culture and technology, personality
arguably became a commodity.64

54

Id.
Id.
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73 IND. L.J. 1, 27 (1997) (“Our society’s
view of fame was most influenced at the outset by print, and then was completely
revolutionized in the wake of the birth of film and broadcasting.”).
57
Id. at 30 (“Radio, while lacking the visual aspect of film, created a new
level of intimacy by bringing the performer to the listener ‘live.’ This intimacy allowed
people to feel there was very little separating them from the celebrity.”); Henderson,
supra note 25, at 52 (“Unlike movies, radio was a household presence: in 1934 an
average radio cost about $35, and 60% of all American household had at least one set.
And, unlike records, radio was live: entertainment and information were there at the
touch of the dial.”).
58
Kwall, supra note 56, at 29 (“The motion picture, like the photograph,
delivered a new level of realism, only it was superior to photographs in that it
transcended the provision of stars’ images and allowed audiences to observe stars’
behaviors and mannerisms.”).
59
Madow, supra note 3, at 162 (“Moviegoers, in contrast [to those who
attended stage performances], got to see their favorites regularly—and, most
importantly, they got to see them in close-ups. This fostered an illusion of intimacy and
generated widespread curiosity about the stars’ private lives and doings.”).
60
Kwall, supra note 56, at 31.
61
Henderson, supra note 25, at 50-51.
62
Id. at 51.
63
For example, Professor Madow points to two advertising practices using
celebrities: product placements in movies and celebrity endorsements. Madow, supra
note 3, at 164-65.
64
Id. at 166.
55
56

2012]

RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

1141

Mass media, and in particular early Hollywood, played a
substantial role in the commodification of personality. For
instance, mass media notoriously “packaged” celebrities⎯turning
nobodies into the famous through a careful media strategy to
maximize commercial value.65 Prior to the 1950s, despite society’s
treatment of personality as a commodity for nearly half century,
property law provided no rights to protect this new value.66
2. Media Exploits and Expands the Commodity of
Persona
An explanation of the commodification of personality is
incomplete without an analysis of the media structure itself. In
particular, the motion picture industry, with its prominence
before radio and television, played a substantial role in
exploiting personas for commercial gain. Between 1912 and
1915, movie producers moved to California and opened up the
first studios.67 Studios in the first half of the twentieth century
approached movie making like mass production.68 In a process
known as vertical integration,69 studios dominated every aspect
of the industry.70 They owned the film lots, the means to
produce feature length movies, and the theaters where
audiences watched the final products.71 Most importantly, the
studios controlled the actors of the era. Prior to 1948, studios
hired actors to work exclusively for them72 and controlled nearly
every aspect of actors’ careers.73 One writer summarized,
“Imagine working under a seven-year contract that you cannot
break and more than likely will be forced to renew, for a
producer who can tell you who you can marry, what your

65

Kwall, supra note 56, at 32-34.
See, e.g., infra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
67
The Emergence of the Hollywood Studio System, FILMREFERENCE.COM,
http://www.filmreference.com/encyclopedia/Romantic-Comedy-Yugoslavia/Studio-SystemTHE-EMERGENCE-OF-THE-HOLLYWOODSTUDIO-SYSTEM.html (last visited Jan.
10, 2012).
68
Id.
69
See id.; see also THOMAS SCHATZ, THE GENIUS OF THE SYSTEM: HOLLYWOOD
FILMMAKING IN THE STUDIO ERA 39 (First Univ. of Minn. Press 2010) (1989) (describing
how studios coordinated movie production with theatre operations).
70
See The Emergence of the Hollywood Studio System, supra note 67.
71
Id. (“Key to the studio system was the Big Eight’s domination of all areas
of the industry.”).
72
Ken Orsatti, How SAG Was Founded: The Actor’s Road to Empowerment,
SCREEN ACTORS GUILD (1995), http://www.sag.org/node/22.
73
See SCHATZ, supra note 69, at 42 (explaining that actors had “little control
over their individual careers or their pictures”).
66
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morals must be, even what political opinions to hold.”74 Indeed,
movie studios exploited the personas of their actors by
controlling the licensing of stars’ images to advertisers.75
The studio system thrived on monopolistic practices.76
Studios refused to poach each other’s actors.77 Collusive norms
within the movie industry and the massive amount of control
that the studios exacted over their actors allowed only rare
commercial misappropriation of actors.78
However, in 1948, the Supreme Court handed down a
landmark decision in United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., which shocked the equilibrium within mass media. The
Court held that the “Big Five” movie studios’ ownership of and
dealings with theaters violated antitrust law.79 The courts
ordered divestment from ownership of theaters80 and effectively
ended the studio system.81 The studio RKO was the first to
74

Orsatti, supra note 72.
One notable example of the studios contracting their stars out for
endorsements occurred in the tobacco industry. Given that the tobacco industry had a
large national advertising budget, the studios placed their stars in “tie-ins,” where
stars in tobacco ads sold both tobacco and new movies. K.L. Lum et al., Signed, Sealed
and Delivered: “Big Tobacco” in Hollywood, 1927-1951, 17 TOBACCO CONTROL 313, 314
(2008). The studios “maximize[d] marketing opportunities” through “[c]ross-promotion”
advertisements that showcased tobacco products and big budget films together. Id. at
321. While the studios controlled when and where advertisers could use the stars’
personas, these “campaigns also paid stars substantial sums while reinforcing the
stars’ notoriety, boosting their value to the studios and other national advertisers.” Id.
76
See SCHATZ, supra note 69, at 9 (“The Hollywood studio system was, as
economists and the federal courts well understood, a ‘mature-oligopoly’—a group of
companies cooperating to control a certain market.”). For example, the studios engaged
in block-booking with theaters, which is “the practice of licensing . . . one feature or
group of features on condition that the exhibitor will also license another feature or
group of features released by the distributors during a given period.” United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156 (1948). In order to have the rights to show
quality movies, the studios forced the theaters to buy lesser quality movies. SCHATZ,
supra note 69, at 39 (describing how studios used block booking and blind bidding to
forced theatre owners to run second rate movies in order to access “A-class features and
star vehicles”).
77
Orsatti, supra note 72 (“As there was a tacit agreement among studios not
to raid each other for a star[’]s services at their contracts end, actors were not able to
choose their roles which is crucial in building a career.”).
78
Id.; see K.L. Lum et al., supra note 75, at 318 (“[S]tudio talent contracts
gave studios complete control over the use of their celebrity ‘brand names’. Major
studios negotiated the content of testimonials, insisted that the timing of adverts and
radio appearances be coordinated with movie releases, and denied permission for deals
that did not serve their interest.”).
79
Paramount, 334 U.S. at 141-61.
80
Id. at 175 (remanding the case to district court to determine whether
divesture was necessary); United States v. Paramount, 85 F. Supp. 881, 899-900
(S.D.N.Y. 1949) (ordering studios’ divestment from theaters).
81
See The Independent Producers and the Paramount Case, 1938-1949, SOC’Y OF
INDEP. MOTION PICTURE PRODUCERS, http://www.cobbles.com/simpp_archive/paramountcase_
6supreme1948.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).
75
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break the vertical integration by divesting from theater
ownership, and the others followed suit soon afterwards.82 As
part of the movie industry’s restructuring, studios no longer
hired actors in long-term contracts; instead, the studios hired
actors per film.83 The actors became free agents.84 However
ironically, actors no longer received the studios’ protection,
which had long defended actors’ personas through collusive
practices.85 As a result, entertainers needed a new form of
protection to stop misappropriation of their most valuable
assets: their identities.
The invention of television brought additional instability.
Actors feared that television stations would replay movies with
impunity, resulting in fewer movie productions, less employment
of screen actors, and diminution in value of personalities.86 One
commentator explains, “By repeating episodes of favorite
television programs and by airing old movies, television
producers could squeeze additional revenue out of entertainment
products with very little extra expenditure.”87
Commodification of personality also occurred within
professional athletics.88 Similar to the control that the studio
system exacted over actors, the notion of amateurism regulated
nineteenth-century athletes’ abilities to commodify their public
persona.89 However, starting in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, professional athletics allowed athletes to be

82

See id.
Emily C. Chi, Star Quality and Job Security: The Role of the Performers’
Unions in Controlling Access to the Acting Profession, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1,
31-33 (2000).
84
See SCHATZ, supra note 69, at 482 (“For top industry talent . . . declining
studio control meant unprecedented freedom and opportunity.”).
85
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
86
See Chi, supra note 83, at 35-36. Television, initially centered in New York,
brought significant unemployment to the movie actors who were located in California.
Id. at 35.
87
Id.
88
See Kristi Lee Covington Baker, A History of Sports Marketing and the
Media 1 (Dec. 6, 2007) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Univ. of Kan.) (on file with author).
89
See Henry Yu, Tiger Woods at the Center of History: Looking Back at the
Twentieth Century Through the Lenses of Race, Sports, and Mass Consumption, in
SPORTS MATTERS: RACE, RECREATION, AND CULTURE, 320, 322 (John Bloom & Michael
Nevin Willard eds., 2002) (“[A]mateur sports almost exclusively involved men of
privilege whose wealth meant they did not have to exchange labor for money, and
therefore their sporting activities were practices exempt from monetary transactions.”).
For example, the Olympic Committee stripped Jim Thorpe of his gold medals in track
after it became apparent that he had been compensated for playing in minor league
baseball in the past. Covington Baker, supra note 88, at 13.
83
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compensated for their performance.90 Starting in the 1920s,
radio broadcasting within sports, particularly within baseball,
communicated sports contests throughout the nation, as
athletes became icons.91 Unlike actors under the studio system,
professional athletes largely had control over licensing their
personas.92 For example, Babe Ruth made approximately half
his salary in endorsements during the 1920s and had a
substantial effect on society given “the number of personal and
radio appearances . . . as well as photo images and newspaper
articles about him.”93 Given professional athletes’ personal
control over the public’s perceptions of them, as opposed to
actors who had ceded any rights to studios that were engaged
in collusive activities, there was some demand for legal
protection against misappropriating their personas. This can
be seen in right of privacy cases, like Hanna v. Hillerich &
Bradsby Co.94 and O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co.,95 in which athletes
argued invasion of privacy when their images had been
misappropriated.96 Nevertheless, like for actors, the advent of
the television brought about significant increase in athletes’
exposure to the American public, and with it an increased
probability that their images would be misappropriated.97 Thus,
although the need to protect athletes’ personas was addressed
with the advent of professional sports, the demand for greater
legal protection only increased with the invention of television.
Athletes’ increased demand coincided with actors’ needs, as
seen from the end of the studio era.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
nature of fame changed, which resulted in commodifying of
identity. No rights existed to protect these new commodities,
but the amount of control under the studio system made these
rights moot. However, the remarkable changes to movie studio
structuring and the advent of television quickly required new
90

See Covington Baker, supra note 88, at 6-7 (describing the compensation
for professional football teams in the 1890’s).
91
Id. at 7-11.
92
See, e.g., id. at 10-11 (describing how Red Grange, a professional football
player from the 1920s and 1930s, endorsed a number of products, including ginger ale,
candy bars, and meatloaf).
93
Id. at 11.
94
78 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1935).
95
124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1942).
96
See infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
97
Covington Baker, supra note 88, at 14-18. For example, Baseball Weekly
ranked television “as the most important change in the game of baseball during the
20th century, second only to Jackie Robinson’s breaking the color barrier.” Id. at 16.
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rights. Both the right of publicity and patterns of collective
bargaining in entertainment derive from a need for more
protection of personalities in an age where image was valuable
but no longer institutionally controlled.
B.

Right of Publicity as a Response

The right of publicity can be seen as a direct legal
response to the commodification of personality and
technological change. Doctrinally, the right of publicity has its
genesis in the right of privacy.98 Warren and Brandeis
advocated for a new common law right of privacy, which
protected the “right to be let alone.”99 William Prosser later
famously divided privacy into four distinct torts that are
generally recognized,100 but the only category that is relevant
for the purposes of this note is the one that Prosser called
“[a]ppropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the
plaintiff’s name or likeness.”101 The right of privacy for
misappropriation vindicates plaintiffs for mental distress,
rather than commercial loss, resulting from unwillingly being
placed in the public eye.102
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.103 was the first
case to test the right of privacy. The Franklin Mills Company,
one of the defendants, placed a picture of Abigail Roberson, the
plaintiff, on twenty-five thousand packages of flour without her
consent.104 Roberson claimed that she suffered mental distress105
and that the advertisement violated her right to privacy.106 The
court refused to recognize a common law right of privacy, but
98

See, e.g., Dymond, supra note 23, at 449; Dogan & Lemley, supra note 5, at

1167-68.
99

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 193.
William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (“The law of
privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the
plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have almost
nothing in common except that each represents an interference with the right of the
plaintiff, in the phrase coined by Judge Cooley, ‘to be let alone.’”); 1 MCCARTHY, supra
note 1, § 1:19 (“The courts have almost uniformly adopted Prosser’s four-part division
as the ‘gospel’ of privacy law. Anyone who refuses to talk in Prosser’s language will
meet blank stares of incomprehension.”).
101
Prosser, supra note 100, at 389.
102
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:7.
103
64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
104
Id. at 442.
105
Id. (“[H]er good name has been attacked, causing her great distress and
suffering, both in body and mind; that she was made sick, and suffered a severe
nervous shock, was confined to her bed, and compelled to employ a physician, because
of these facts . . . .”).
106
Id. at 443.
100
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suggested that the legislature could enact a statute creating
such a right.107 In response to Roberson, the New York State
legislature passed section 50 of the N.Y. Civil Rights Law,108
which proscribes using “name, portrait or picture of any living
person without having first obtained the written consent” for
advertising or trade purposes.109
The Georgia Supreme Court broke with New York’s
rejection of the common law right of privacy in Pavesich v. New
England Life Ins. Co.110 Under facts similar to Roberson,111 the
court concluded that there was a common law right of privacy112
and that “[t]he novelty of the complaint is no objection, when an
injury cognizable by law is shown to have been inflicted on the
plaintiff.”113 Pavesich adopts several influential rules of law from
Warren and Brandeis’s article that affected the development of
publicity rights. First, the court recognized that public figures
waive their rights of privacy to the extent that the information
disclosed is relevant to the public interest.114 The court recited
the example that a political candidate loses a certain degree of
privacy in his or her private life because private information
“may throw light upon his qualifications for the office, or the
advisability of imposing upon him the public trust which the
office carries.”115 Second, the court declared that the right of
privacy is a personal right116 that is not assignable.
With increasing acceptance of a privacy right for
misappropriation, several plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted
to use privacy as a legal protection against misappropriating
celebrities’ images. In essence, these claims sought damages for
harm done to a professional persona rather than any actual
mental distress suffered by the plaintiff. First, in Hanna
107

Id. (“The legislative body could very well interfere and arbitrarily provide
that no one should be permitted for his own selfish purpose to use the picture or the
name of another for advertising purposes without his consent.”).
108
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:16.
109
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2011).
110
50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
111
See id. at 68-69 (suing for defendant’s use of picture in a newspaper
advertisement without the plaintiff’s consent).
112
Id. at 78.
113
Id. at 69.
114
Id. at 72 (“The right of privacy, however, like every other right that rests in
the individual, may be waived by him, or by any one authorized by him, or by any one
whom the law empowers to act in his behalf, provided the effect of his waiver will not
be such as to bring before the public those matters of a purely private nature which
express law or public policy demands shall be kept private.”).
115
Id.
116
Id. at 73 (“It therefore follows from what has been said that a violation of
the right of privacy is a direct invasion of a legal right of the individual.”).
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Manufacturing Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., a bat
manufacturer that had the exclusive rights to use the names
and autographs of famous baseball players sued a competing
bat manufacturer for using the same names on its bats.117 The
court held, in part, that the plaintiffs had no right-to-privacy
claim because the baseball players’ names were not property
capable of assignment;118 therefore, the plaintiff gained no
property right from the exclusive contract and had no cause of
action against the infringers.119 Second, in O’Brien v. Pabst
Sales Co., a famous college football player sued a beer
manufacturer for placing his picture in their promotional
calendar without consent.120 The court held that the right of
privacy did not apply because the plaintiff waived his privacy
rights regarding his football career as a public figure.121 Hanna
and O’Brien, respectively, illustrate two major deficiencies in
the right of privacy when it comes to protecting publicity
rights: (1) public waiver of privacy, as seen in O’Brien, and (2)
the nonassignability of personality traits, as seen in Hanna.
Despite several attempts to transform privacy into a
legal protection for celebrities’ persona, the legal system
recognized a right of publicity only after the immense changes
in technology, such as the advent of television and the end of
the studio system within the entertain industry.122 In Haelan
Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,123 a case with eerily
similar facts to Hanna,124 Judge Frank of the Second Circuit
was the first to recognize a right to protect commercial value of
personality.125 Judge Frank was well aware of the
commodification of persona and the significant structural
changes within the entertainment industry, as he wrote:
This right might be called a “right of publicity.” For it is common
knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ballplayers), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure
of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received

117

Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 78 F.2d 763, 764 (5th Cir. 1935).
Id. at 766.
Id. at 766-67.
120
O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 168 (5th Cir. 1942).
121
Id. at 170.
122
See supra Part I.A.
123
202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
124
Like the bat manufactures in Hanna, in Haelan, a gum manufacturer sued a
rival gum manufacturer for inducing a baseball player, who had an exclusive contract with
the plaintiff, to allow the defendant to use the player’s image in advertisements. Id. at 867.
125
Id. at 868.
118
119
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money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances,
displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and subways.126

Academics of the era defended the newly created right
of publicity and provided a more elaborate justification. In his
law review article The Right of Publicity,127 Melville B. Nimmer
argued that the right of privacy “is not adequate to meet the
demands of the second half of the twentieth century,
particularly with respect to the advertising, motion picture,
television, and radio industries.”128 His specific concern for the
entertainment industry shows that the right of publicity was
supposed to address not only the commodification of persona,
but also the significant technological and structural changes in
the entertainment industry.
C.

Collective Bargaining Agreements as a Response

The right of publicity was not the exclusive response to
the commodification of personality and rapidly improving
technology. Entertainment collective bargaining agreements
also sought to protect actors from misappropriation of their
commercial images. Unions in the entertainment industry
existed long before the 1950s.129 Under the studio system, which
provided relatively stable employment,130 workers formed unions
to guarantee standardized wages131 and working conditions.132
The unions’ jurisdiction divided along profession. Each position
within the industry had its own craft union.133 For example, the
126
127

Id.
Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.

203 (1954).
128

Id. (emphasis added).
For example, Actors’ Equity Association, which represents theater actors,
started in the early twentieth century, and was recognized by the American Federation of
Labor in 1919. Historical Overview, ACTORS’ EQUITY ASS’N, http://www.actorsequity.org/
aboutequity/historicaloverview.asp (last visited Jan. 10, 2010).
130
Alan Paul & Archie Kleingartner, Flexible Production and the
Transformation of Industrial Relations in the Motion Picture and Television Industry,
47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 663, 666 (1994).
131
See DAVID F. PRINDLE, THE POLITICS OF GLAMOUR: IDEOLOGY AND
DEMOCRACY IN THE SCREEN ACTORS GUILD 16-25 (1988) (describing how SAG was
formed following a significant pay cut in 1933).
132
See Orsatti, supra note 72 (suggesting that SAG gained better working
conditions for actors under the studio system, but “the studios still basically ‘owned’
their stars”).
133
See Paul & Kleingartner, supra note 130, at 666 (“DGA represents all
directors, whether in film or videotape production; WGA has jurisdiction over writers,
including most news writers; SAG and the American Federation of Television and
Radio Artists (AFTRA) represent all performers except instrumental musicians, who
are represented by the American Federation of Musicians . . . .”).
129
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American Federation of Radio Artists, the precursor to AFTRA,
started as a representative of radio performers,134 and SAG
represented actors in movies and later television.135
After the collapse of the studio system and the advent of
new technology, actors faced less demand for their services and
massive unemployment.136 Two technological advances at that
time were particularly important. First, starting in the early
1940s, radio gained the ability to record and rerun radio
shows.137 Second, starting in the 1950s, television began
rerunning programming and movies on television.138 Both of
these practices reduced the number of productions while
continuing to expose the performers to the public at large,
thereby diminishing the value of the actors’ personas.
To address these issues, unions compromised. Following
the demise of the studio system, performers’ unions no longer
fought for job security.139 Instead, the unions focused on
increasing the wages and working conditions of their rank-andfile members when they actually had work.140 To do so, the
unions negotiated for a three-tier compensation system,141
134

History, AM. FED. TELEVISION & RADIO ARTISTS (July 13, 2009),
http://www.aftra.org/history.htm.
135
PRINDLE, supra note 131, at 3 (“The guild is a labor union composed of
actors who have performed in feature motion pictures, television series, television
commercials, and industrial and educational films.”).
136
Chi, supra note 83, at 33 (“Consequently, many actors were set adrift from
the studios and, faced for the first time with uncertain professional futures . . . .”).
137
Matt Jackson, Residuals, MUSEUM BROAD. COMM., http://www.museum.tv/
eotvsection.php?entrycode=residuals (last visited Jan. 10, 2012). Residuals payable to
unions date as far back as the 1920s for phonograph recording. Paul & Kleingartner, supra
note 130, at 669. However, scholars generally recognize the 1941 American Federation of
Radio Artists’ (AFRA) Transcription Code as the first instance of performers receiving
residual payments for reuse of radio programming. Id.; see also Jackson, supra.
138
Paul & Kleingartner, supra note 130, at 669; see also PRINDLE, supra note
131, at 82 (“As the 1950s advanced, it became clear to the networks that filmed television
was superior to live. For one thing, film could be shown at the same time in each time
zone. For another, it could record a performance on one day and be broadcast on another.
Moreover, film could be saved and reshown, thus generating revenue many times,
whereas once a live performance was over it and its earnings were gone forever.”).
139
See Chi, supra note 83, at 34 (describing how the union became a
mechanism of “monitoring and restricting access to acting work”); see also PRINDLE,
supra note 131, at 11 (“One of the major functions of a union—providing its members
with job security—is therefore forbidden.”).
140
See Chi, supra note 83, at 27 (“Together, the above-the-line entertainment
unions, including but not limited to SAG and AEA, estimate that ninety to ninety-five
percent of their members are unemployed on any given day. . . . Although the talent unions
have secured higher wages and more humane working conditions for their members, a union
card cannot guarantee employment.” (emphasis added)); see also Mission Statement,
SCREEN ACTORS GUILD, http://www.sag.org/about-us/mission-statement (last visited Feb. 16,
2012) (“The Guild exists to enhance actors’ working conditions, compensation and benefits
and to be a powerful, unified voice on behalf of artists’ rights.”).
141
Paul & Kleingartner, supra note 130, at 667.
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which still exists today.142 First, all actors receive minimum
wage rates.143 The minimum wage rates compensate actors for
time spent working on a project,144 and compensate directors
and writers for products delivered.145 Second, personal servicecontracts provisions within the collective bargaining
agreements allow individuals to negotiate outside of the
collective bargaining compensation scale, provided that the
wages are higher than the contract scale.146 These allow wellknown or high-quality actors, writers, and directors to demand
more for their services.147 Third, and most importantly, actors
receive
residual
payments.
Residual
payments
are
supplemental payments to actors for reuse of “entertainment
product in media other than the one for which it was originally
created, or for its reuse within the same medium subsequent to
the initial exhibition.”148
Residual payments first appeared in 1941 when radio
introduced recording technology.149 Prior to this advancement,
radio performers presented their program multiple times per
day—at least once on the East Coast and once on the West
Coast.150 Since the performers were paid per performance, had
the American Federation of Artists not secured residual
payments, compensation would have been cut in half without
supplemental payment for the programming’s reuse.151 Residuals
emerged next in television. SAG secured residual payments for
its members for rerunning television programs in 1952,152 for
repeated use of television commercials in 1953, and for movies
reformatted and aired on television in 1960.153 Residuals
142

See infra Part II.B.2 (describing how the same three-tier compensation
system still operates under the current Commercials Contract).
143
Paul & Kleingartner, supra note 130, at 667 (detailing how entertainment
contracts “contain[] a minimum compensation schedule”).
144
Id. (describing how entertainment contracts calculate actors’, singers’, and
stunt players’ minimum rates based on either a day rate, week rate, or a rate for a
specified term).
145
Id.
146
Id. at 668.
147
Id. at 669 (“Personal service contracts provide for the exchange of scarce,
differentiable, and perishable talent.”).
148
Id.; see also PRINDLE, supra note 131, at 82 (describing how residual
payments became a necessity to actors’ economic survival after movies could be
replayed on television, as “[a]ctors discovered that they were competing with their
former selves for jobs, and losing”).
149
Jackson, supra note 137.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.; Orsatti, supra note 72.
153
Orsatti, supra note 72.
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expanded to nearly all collective bargaining agreements in the
entertainment industry, including writers and directors.154
Not all performers that work under entertainment
contracts receive residual payments. Under the standard union
contracts, only those whose professional personas are exploited
by reuse are paid residuals. In film, television, and television
commercials, only principal actors receive residual payments;
extras are entitled only to minimum payments.155 Even writers
represented by the Writers’ Guild of America (WGA) receive
residual payments for screenplays only when they are given
screen credit.156 Given this set of circumstances, the residual
payments represent more than a deferral in compensation to
offset long periods of unemployment; to fulfill that justification,
they would have to extend to everyone in the industry. Instead,
residuals compensate workers for dilution of their professionalpersona value by exploiting reuse of contractually bound
material. The emergence of residual payments, like the right of
publicity, was a reaction to the commodification of identity and
advancing technology, but within the contractual relationship
rather than the world at large.
II.

HOW THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING PROTECT AGAINST MISUSE OF PERSONA

Thus far, this note has established that the right of
publicity and patterns in collective bargaining in the
entertainment industry arose from the same historical context. In
the entertainment industry, the right of publicity and collective
bargaining agreements also both operate to protect actors against
misappropriation of their personas. This section will draw upon
the AFTRA/SAG Television Commercials Contracts with the
ANA/AAA (Commercials Contracts) to illustrate how collective
bargaining agreements afford these protections.
A.

Scope of the Rights

Both the right of publicity and the Commercials
Contracts are limited in scope. However, a brief analysis of

154

See Paul & Kleingartner, supra note 130, at 671 (describing how residuals
are calculated under various collective bargaining contracts).
155
Robert W. Gilbert, “Residual Rights” Established by Collective Bargaining
in Television and Radio, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 102, 107 (1958).
156
Id. at 108.
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where and upon whom they apply will show that both are
disproportionately influential on the media industry.
1. The Scope of the Right of Publicity
The right of publicity is a state law doctrine recognized
in approximately nineteen states by statute.157 Twenty-one
states recognize a common law right of publicity,158 eight of
which also have a statute.159 Therefore, thirty-one states have
explicitly recognized the right of publicity. The protections
afforded under the right of publicity vary from state to state.
While the number of states that recognize the right of publicity
is limited, the right’s effect on media is enormous because the
largest and most media-concentrated states accept it. In
particular, one writer points to California, New York, and
Tennessee as the states “whose economies are impacted the
most by the entertainment industry.”160
2. Scope of the Commercials Contracts
The Commercials Contracts are collective bargaining
agreements between actors’ unions and the advertising
industry. The Joint Policy Committee for Broadcast Talent
Relations (JPC) represents advertising management in
negotiations.161 JPC is a multi-employer bargaining unit

157

See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 6:8 (identifying California, Florida,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin as recognizing right of publicity by statute); see also Hunt,
supra note 23, at 1607 n.20 (listing eighteen states, but excluding Pennsylvania which
passed its statute after the publication of Hunt’s article).
158
See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 6:3 (identifying Alabama, Arizona,
California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin as recognizing right of publicity
through common law).
159
See id. § 6:3 nn.7-8 (identifying California, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin as having both a common law and statutory right).
160
Dymond, supra note 23, at 448.
161
See Memorandum from Douglas J. Wood, ANA-AAAA Joint Policy Comm. on
Broad. Talent Union Relations, Unions and the Prod. of Commercials for Traditional and
Non-Traditional Media 1 (Jan. 28, 2009), available at http://www.adlawbyrequest.com/
uploads/file/Why%20be%20an%20Authorizer.pdf (“The JPC is the multi-employer
bargaining unit that represents the interests of the advertising industry in negotiations
with the various unions that represent performers and musicians who perform
commercials . . . . The JPC is comprised of thirty members—fifteen appointed by the
Association of National Advertisers and fifteen appointed by the American Association of
Advertising Agencies. The ANA also appoints the JPC Lead Negotiator and legal counsel.”).
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comprising the Association of National Advertisers (ANA)162 and
the American Association of Advertising Agencies (AAAA).163
JPC negotiates the collective bargaining agreements jointly
with the Screen Actors Guild (SAG) and the American
Federation of Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA).164
The Commercials Contracts deal exclusively with
advertisements on television, Internet, radio, and new media,
such as video advertisements on cellular phones.165 The
contracts do not bind non-union employers, and do not cover
photography for print advertising.166 Like the right of publicity,
the Commercials Contracts are limited in scope but influential
on the advertising industry. Advertisers produce 90 percent of
television commercials under the Commercials Contracts,167
which totals approximately $1 billion in compensation to
unionized performers.168

162

The ANA is a trade organization for companies that advertise. It represents
more than four hundred companies and ten thousand brands, which spend more than
$250 billion on advertising and marketing annually. About the ANA: Leading the
Marketing Community, ASS’N NAT’L ADVERTISERS, http://www.ana.net/about (last visited
Jan. 11, 2012).
163
AAAA is a national trade organization for advertising agencies. Its
members produce approximately 80 percent of all advertisements within the United
States annually. Join Us, AM. ASS’N ADVERTISING AGENCIES, http://www.aaaa.org/
about/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 11, 2012).
164
See Wood, supra 161, at 1.
165
See 2003 Commercials Contract, Screen Actors Guild and the ANA-AAAA
Joint Policy Committee on Broadcast Talent Relations §§ 4-5, as amended by Screen
Actors Guild 2006-2008 Extension to the Commercials Contract Memorandum of
Agreement §§ 2, 6, as amended by Screen Actors Guild 2009 Commercials Memorandum
of Agreement §§ 9-10 [hereinafter SAG Commercials Contract]; 2003 AFTRA Television
Recorded Commercials Contract, American Federation of Television and Radio Artists,
Association of National Advertisers, and American Association of Advertising Agencies
Joint Policy Committee on Broadcast Talent Relations § I(1)(B), as amended by American
Federation of Television and Radio Artists 2006-2008 Extension to the Television
Recorded Commercials Contract Memorandum of Agreement § 5, as amended by
American Federation of Television and Radio Artists 2009 Television Recorded
Commercials Contract Memorandum of Agreement §§ 9-10 [hereinafter AFTRA
Commercials Contract]. All documents related to both SAG’s and AFTRA’s Commercials
Contracts are available at http://www.adlawbyrequest.com/articles/unions/.
166
See SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 5 (limiting scope of
contract to commercials); id. § 4 (defining “commercials” as “short advertising or
commercial messages made as motion pictures, 3 minutes or less in length, and
intended for showing over television” (emphasis added)); AFTRA Commercials
Contract, supra note 165, §§ 1(B), 4(A) (same).
167
Jack Neff, Industry Explores New Compensation Model for $1 Billion in
Commercial Talent Fees, ADVERTISING AGE (May 3, 2010), http://adage.com/article/
news/industry-explores-compensation-model-talent-fees/143638/.
168
Wood, supra note 161, at 1.
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The Nature of the Right

Both the right of publicity and the Commercials
Contracts create a framework for individuals to control their
personas within commercials. The significant difference
between the two is that the Commercials Contracts protect
against misuse by the other party to the agreement, whereas
the right of publicity protects against the world at large.
1. The Nature of the Right of Publicity
The right of publicity is “the inherent right of every
human being to control the commercial use of his or her
identity.”169 It protects the plaintiff from unauthorized
commercial use that causes damage to the commercial value of
his or her persona.170 The right of publicity treats personality as
property that the owner can exclude others from using for
commercial gain.171 As a result, unlike the right of privacy,
publicity rights are fully assignable.172 Furthermore, many
states allow a performer’s right of publicity to pass to that
performer’s heirs.173 Remedies for an infringement of the right
of publicity include an injunction against future use, statutory
damages, compensatory damages, disgorgement of profits,
punitive damages, and attorney’s fees.174 Therefore, the right of

169

1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:3.
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (“[T]he
State’s interest in permitting a ‘right of publicity’ is in protecting the proprietary
interest of the individual . . . .”); see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 3:2 (“Likely
damage to commercial value is a hallmark of the right of publicity, distinguishing it
from the various types of ‘privacy’ rights. However, this is not to state that evidence of
some quantifiable commercial damage is an essential element of proof of liability for
infringement of the right of publicity.” (footnote omitted)).
171
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995) (“One who
appropriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by using without consent the
person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to
liability . . . .”); id. at cmt. g (“The interest in the commercial value of a person’s identity is
in the nature of a property right . . . .”); see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 10:7.
172
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46, cmt. g (“[T]he
commercial value of a person’s identity is . . . freely assignable to others.”).
173
Some states allow estates to enforce the right of publicity for a limited
number of years after death. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(g) (West Supp. 2012)
(granting the estate the right of publicity for up to seventy years after death). Other
states grant the estate a right of publicity for a minimum number of years followed by
a right in perpetuity, which permits enforcement for as long as the estate continues to
exploit the persona commercially. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104 (2001) (granting
the estate a minimum right for ten years, and a right in perpetuity that extinguishes
after two years of disuse).
174
See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 22, §§ 11:21-11:38.
170
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publicity is a guarantee of control over the commercial use of
one’s persona against the world at large.
Since the right of publicity derives from state law, the
amount of protection varies from state to state.175 Nearly every
state that recognizes the right protects against at least the
unauthorized use of name and likeness.176 For example, New
York, which recognizes only a statutory right and not a common
law right,177 protects against the unauthorized use of “name,
portrait, picture or voice.”178 Other states provide for a wider
array of uses that may damage the commercial value of
persona.179 For instance, California’s statutory right protects
against “knowingly us[ing] another’s name, voice, signature,
photograph, and likeness.”180 California’s common law protects
further against additional types of use, including mannerism,
characterizations, and performing style.181
Additionally, the right of publicity is limited by the
context in which the use takes place. States place particular
constraints on the context of the usage within their statutes or
common law. These constraints exist to comply with First
Amendment free speech, press, and expression, as well as to
prevent the doctrine from stifling cultural exchange in
society.182 For example, in New York, in order for unauthorized
use to be an infringement, it has to be either for advertising or
trade purposes.183 Courts broadly interpret advertising purposes
to include usage in solicitation to buy products or services.184
Trade purposes are uses that draw attention to the defendant’s
business, but do not directly solicit.185 Furthermore, New York
175

See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 6:8.
See, e.g., id. (listing that every statutorily recognized right of publicity
protects against the unauthorized use of name and likeness).
177
Stephano v. News Grp. Publ’ns, Inc., 474 N.E.2d. 580, 584 (N.Y. 1985)
(ruling that the right of privacy is statutory, and there is no common law cause of
action in New York).
178
Dymond, supra 23, at 447.
179
See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding under California law that a robot in a commercial that was made to
resemble Vanna White infringed on her common law right of publicity);
Motschenbacher v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 825-27 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding
under California law that using a car that looked similar to the plaintiff’s racing car
infringed on his right of publicity).
180
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1997).
181
Dymond, supra note 23, at 464-65.
182
See Hunt, supra note 23, at 1629-39 (discussing restrictions on media and
commercial speech).
183
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 6:86.
184
Id.
185
Id.
176
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exempts certain uses without the subject’s consent, including
use within the news,186 and incidental uses.187
2. The Nature of Persona Rights Under the
Commercials Contracts
Like the right of publicity, the Commercials Contracts
allow principal performers control over the use of their
persona, but within the confines of a contractual relationship.
A number of specific contractual provisions demonstrate the
nature and limit of this control.
First, and most importantly, the compensation structure
protects performers from damage to the commercial value of
their personas by placing a supplemental price on use of the
commercial. All performers are entitled to session fees of varying
amounts depending on their role within the production.188
Session fees represent the minimum compensation within the
three-tier structure implemented by the union.189 Principal
performers, as opposed to extras,190 are central to the purpose of
the commercial; their personas are used and identifiable within
the commercial.191 As a result, the Contract gives additional
compensation to principal performers in the form of holding fees
and residual compensation.

186

Id. § 6:93 (“[T]here is no doubt that there is no statutory liability for
distribution and syndication of a general interest television news program which shows
a film of the plaintiff as part of a newsworthy report.”). The First Amendment places
additional limits on the right of publicity. See supra note 22. However, New York’s
statutory scheme prohibits newsworthy uses in advertising material. See 1 MCCARTHY,
supra note 1, § 6:89 (“The fact that newsworthy information also appears in a context
that clearly advertises a product or service does not immunize what would otherwise be
a violation of the statutory right.”).
187
Id. § 6:90 (“New York recognizes an ‘incidental use’ exception from
statutory liability for insignificant or fleeting usages of persona that have no real
commercial significance.”).
188
See SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 20 (“Producer shall pay
principal performers the following rates per 8-hour day which shall also constitute
payment for the first commercial made for one designated advertiser . . . .” (emphasis
added)); AFTRA Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 20 (same); SAG Commercials
Contract, supra note 165, sch. D, § 6 (detailing minimum rates for extras); AFTRA
Commercials Contract, supra note 165, sch. C, § 2 (same).
189
See supra note 143-45 and accompanying text.
190
See infra Part IV.B (discussing the distinction between principal
performers and extras, and how that distinction relates to the incidental use doctrine
within the right of publicity).
191
SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 6 (listing the types of uses
that constitute principal performers, including speaking lines or silent appearance of a
face that can be identified with a product); AFTRA Commercials Contract, supra note
165, § 6 (same).
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Holding fees are payments from the advertiser to the
principal performer for each thirteen-week cycle that the
advertisement airs.192 The session fee constitutes the holding fee
for the first thirteen-week cycle,193 but subsequent cycles
require payment of a holding fee equal to the original session
fee.194 An advertiser’s failure to pay holding fees voids its right
to use the commercial.195 Ultimately, holding fees place a price
on airing commercials over an extended period, and
compensate actors for damage done to their commercial value
when advertisements are aired over a long period of time.
Traditionally, residual payments paid performers for
each reuse of the commercial within the thirteen-week cycle.196
But under the contract, which is the product of over fifty years
of negotiation,197 the exact calculation for residuals varies
depending on the television channel and the geographic reach
of the commercial broadcast. For example, Class A
commercials, which run on traditional networks like NBC and
air in sufficient locations, receive payments every time the
commercial airs.198 Cable commercials, on the other hand,
compensate principal performers with residual payments for
only the first two thousand airings.199 To fix anomalies, the
advertising industry has proposed calculating residuals across
all television programming based on gross rating points (GRP)
192

SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 31; AFTRA Commercials
Contract, supra note 165, § 31.
193
SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 31(c) (“The session fee shall
be deemed the holding fee payable for the first fixed cycle.”); AFTRA Commercials
Contract, supra note 165, § 31(c) (same).
194
SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 31(b) (“[U]pon the
commencement of each consecutive fixed cycle thereafter throughout the maximum
permissible period of use or any extension thereof, a principal performer shall be paid a
separate fee, herein called the holding fee, in an amount equal to a session fee . . . .”);
AFTRA Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 31(b) (same).
195
SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 31(e) (“If Producer fails to
pay the holding fee on or before the date on which it is due . . . all further right of
Producer to use the commercial shall cease and terminate, and the principal performer
shall thereupon be automatically released from all contractual obligations with respect
to the commercial.”); AFTRA Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 31(e) (same).
196
Susan Shelley, The Screen Actors Guild and the Commercials Strike of
1978-79 (1979) (research paper), available at http://www.extremeink.com/strike.htm
(last visited Jan. 13, 2012) (“Actors, in other words, would receive continuing payments
as long as their work was being used to generate revenue for an advertiser.”).
197
Neff, supra note 167 (“The current system is based on a model first
developed in the 1950s . . . .”); see also Shelley, supra note 196 (describing that the
general terms of the SAG Commercials Contract date back to the 1950’s).
198
SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 34(a)-(b); AFTRA
Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 34(a)-(b).
199
SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 35(c); AFTRA Commercials
Contract, supra note 165, § 35(c).
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rather than a pay-per-use standard.200 In effect, advertisers
would pay residuals based on the number of viewers that saw
the commercial rather than the number of times the
commercial aired.201 Additionally, similar to states that allow a
descendible right of publicity, the heirs of principal performers
are entitled to residuals postmortem.202 In this sense, the
residuals are analogous to a property right rather than a
typical contractual right.
Regardless of how the contract calculates residuals, they
represent more than mere supplemental compensation. Legally,
despite several attempts to treat residuals as a form of
property,203 the law treats them as supplemental compensation.204
Indeed, residuals account for the largest proportion of
compensation under the Commercials Contracts.205 Performers
often survive long periods of unemployment through residuals,
as they are deferred compensation.206 Economically, however,
residuals play a larger role than typical deferred compensation.
Residual payments protect principal performers against
overexposure by placing a price on the advertiser for every use of
200

See Neff, supra note 167 (“There can be anomalies in cable buys where the
media costs less than the talent . . . . We hope to switch to the same GRPs and ROI
measurement we use for other media and 99% of the dollars spent, so the tail will no
longer be wagging the dog.” (quoting Douglas Wood)). During the 2009 negotiations,
the parties agreed to retain a consulting firm to assess the feasibility of the proposal,
and to start the 2012 negotiations early to devote time to consider the proposal. SAG
Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 21(a).
201
See BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, TALENT COMPENSATION FINAL STEERING
COMMITTEE MEETING 24 (2007), available at http://www.adlawbyrequest.com/uploads/
file/Talent%20Compensation%20Final%20Update_12192007_main%20document.pdf.
202
Estates, SCREEN ACTORS GUILD, http://www.sag.org/content/estates (last
visited Jan. 13, 2012) (“As you may know, residual payments are made in perpetuity
(as long as a project is being exhibited somewhere in the world). Residuals are
considered property (similar to a piece of artwork) and can be passed through a last
will and testament and/or a living trust.”).
203
See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 155, at 112 n.15 (“§ XXVII of the 1955 Filmed
Commercials contract, which provides that ‘The right of a player to compensation for
the use and re-use of a commercial shall be a vested property right and shall not be
affected by the expiration of this contract or by any act on the part of the
Producer.’”(emphasis added)).
204
See id. at 104 (“From a legal standpoint, the importance of recognizing that
these residuals are a type of wage payment cannot be stressed too greatly.”); Paul &
Kleingartner, supra note 130, at 672 (“In the 1950’s, residuals were seen purely as a
mechanism to compensate workers for lost work and over-exposure.”).
205
See REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF COMMERCIALS MONITORING DURING THE
TERM OF THE SAG/AFTRA 2000 COMMERCIALS CONTRACT 2 (2003), available at
http://www.sag.org/files/sag/documents/Report%20on%20Progress%20-%20Comm%
20Monitoring_0.pdf (citing that residuals comprised of 66 percent of actors’ payments
under the 1998-2002 SAG Commercials Contract).
206
See Paul & Kleingartner, supra note 130, at 672 (“[Residuals] cushion the
impact of unemployment, especially among the neophytes who suffer long periods of
unemployment . . . .”).
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the commercial.207 Paul and Kleingartner explain, “Residuals
reconcile that divergence of interests by specifying cash
compensation for the presumed devaluation of future work via
present-day overexposure.”208 Additionally, expanding residuals
into new media forms maintains an adequate level of
compensation when new technology reduces the demand for
performers’ services.209 Therefore, like the right of publicity,
residuals provide compensation to actors for damage done to
their commercial personas.
The
Commercials
Contracts
provide
principal
performers with other means of control beyond compensation.
The Contracts limit producers’ power to use principal
performers’ work to only agreed-upon commercials.210 If a
producer uses a performer’s work in another commercial, the
performer is entitled to liquidated damages equal to three
session payments and usage fees, as well as residual fees that
would be due had the performer consented to the use.211
Additionally, a performer has the option to arbitrate with or

207

Section 1(a) of the SAG Commercials Contract states that principal
performers receive residual compensation because:
[A] principal performer rendering services in a commercial performs, to a
great extent, the duties of a demonstrator or salesperson of a particular
product or service and as such, tends to be identified with that particular
product or service . . . . [T]his identification increases proportionately with
the continued telecasting of a commercial . . . . [A]dvertisers and their
agencies seldom approve the employment of a principal performer who has
become identified with another product or service, especially if the product or
service is competitive. These conditions and practices tend to reduce
opportunities for further employment in this field.
208

Paul & Kleingartner, supra note 130, at 672.
Id. at 671 (“The single most important factor in the growth of residual
compensation has been the expansion of residual obligations to new entertainment markets.”).
210
SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 17(a)-(b) (“The rights
granted to Producer in commercials shall be limited to the right to use, distribute,
reproduce and/or exhibit such commercials over television . . . . Producer agrees that no
part of the photography or sound track of a principal performer made for a commercial
shall be used other than in commercials as provided hereunder without separately
bargaining with the principal performer and reaching an agreement regarding such
use.”); AFTRA Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 17(a)-(b) (same). But the
contracts provide exceptions that producers can use the “name and likeness of the
principal performer and his/her acts, poses and appearances . . . for the purpose of
publicizing the business of the Producer.” SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165,
§ 17(a); AFTRA Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 17(a). This exception allows
the advertising agencies, photographers and directors to show the content of their work
to prospective clients without violating the contract.
211
SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 17(b); AFTRA Commercials
Contract, supra note 165, § 17(b).
209
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sue a producer rather than accepting liquidated damages
provided within the Commercials Contracts.212
Finally, the Commercials Contracts create options for
principal performers to limit the maximum length an advertiser
can run a commercial to twenty-one months.213 However,
principal performers waive this right if they fail to give written
notification of their desire to cease running the commercial.214
Both the right of publicity and the Commercials
Contracts provide actors ways to control the usage of their
images within advertising. The right of publicity prevents
unauthorized usage and compensates for damage done to the
commercial value of actors’ personas. The Commercials
Contracts give actors some control over the usage of their
images in voluntary relations with advertisers, and compensate
for commercial devaluation of their personas via residuals and
holding fees. Given these analogous functions, the Commercials
Contracts are an apt benchmark for comparison when
considering both the policy justifications and doctrinal rules
within the right of publicity.
III.

ANALYZING THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY’S POLICY
JUSTIFICATIONS BY REFERENCE TO THE COMMERCIALS
CONTRACTS

Justifying the right of publicity has sparked significant
debate among scholars, as it “is both hard to object to and hard
to support.”215 Having a compelling policy justification for the
right of publicity is essential for two reasons. First, it provides
a general rationale for the right of publicity’s existence. Second,
policy justifications affect how judges and legislators shape the
rules and doctrines within the right of publicity. Adopting a
flawed policy justification can lead to illogical doctrine and

212

SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 17(b); AFTRA Commercials
Contract, supra note 165, § 17(b).
213
SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 30(a) (“[T]he maximum
period during which a commercial may be used shall be not more than [twenty-one]
months after the date of commencement of the first fixed cycle . . . .”); AFTRA
Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 30(a) (same).
214
SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 30(d); AFTRA Commercials
Contract, supra note 165, § 30(d). The performer must give the advertiser written
notification no earlier than sixty days before, and no later than 120 days after the
twenty-first month of use. SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 30(d); AFTRA
Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 30(d).
215
David Westfall & David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property Rights, 23
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 122 (2005).
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inequitable consequences.216 The Commercials Contracts—with
their common origin and similar protections to the right of
publicity—can be used as a tool to analyze the merits of
frequently asserted policy justifications for the right of
publicity. This section concludes that any analogy to copyright
or trademark217 fails in light of policy analysis and actual
business custom. Instead, unjust enrichment and natural
rights best explain the right of publicity.
A.

Economic Incentives, Labor Theory, and Copyright

A common justification for the right of publicity is that
it incentivizes creative endeavors, which benefits society as a
whole.218 This justification can be broken down into two steps.
First, it assumes that individuals create the value of their
personas through labor and effort. Professor Haemmerli likens
this explanation to Lockean labor theory.219 For example, in
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,220 the only right
of publicity case the United States Supreme Court has ever
heard, the Court stated that “the State’s interest is closely
analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law, focusing on
the right of the individual to reap the reward of his
endeavors.”221 Melville B. Nimmer, in his seminal article The
Right of Publicity stated:
It is also unquestionably true that in most instances a person achieves
publicity values of substantial pecuniary worth only after he has
expended considerable time, effort, skill, and even money. It would seem
to be a first principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence . . . that every
person is entitled to the fruit of his labors unless there are important
countervailing public policy considerations.222

216

For example, adopting a trademark dilution justification leads to the
conclusion that non-celebrities should not be protected by the right of publicity. See
infra notes 238-44 and accompanying text.
217
See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
218
Kwall, supra note 56, at 35 (“Proponents of the right of publicity often rely
on a copyright law analogy and argue that publicity rights are needed to spur
incentives to creation just as copyright law exists, by constitutional command, to
enhance economic incentives for the betterment of society.” (footnote omitted)).
219
Haemmerli, supra note 9, at 412-13.
220
433 U.S. 562 (1977).
221
Id. at 573.
222
Nimmer, supra note 127, at 216. Other commentators frequently invoke labor
theory justifications. See Goldstein & Kessler, supra note 16, at 819 (“Justification for
affording legal protection to the performer rests on the theory that anyone who contributes
something of value to society should be entitled to share in the fruits of his labor.”); Coyne,
supra note 6, at 812 (“[B]y permitting individuals to benefit from their personal efforts, both
[the right of publicity and copyright] provide incentive for creative endeavor.”).
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The second step of the justification contends that
protecting the fruits of labor incentivizes creativity, which benefits
society. Zacchini concludes: “the protection provides an economic
incentive for [the performer] to make the investment required to
produce a performance of interest to the public.”223 This
justification is analogous to the justification for copyright law.224
Professor Madow questions both of these propositions.
First, he argues that the celebrities with the most valuable
images are not necessarily the hardest working.225 Second, he
argues that there are powerful noneconomic motivations for
fame, which dilute the need for the right of publicity as an
incentive for creativity.226
Looking to collective bargaining at the rank-and-file
level within the entertainment industry shines some light on
whether the most talented actors get the best roles. Many
assume, to justify the higher compensation in the Contract,
that union members are higher-quality actors compared with
non-unionized actors.227 However, Emily C. Chi questions
whether entertainment union members are really better,
arguing that this assumption is a myth.228 According to her,
entertainment unions “operate de facto closed shops.”229
Through strong union security clauses, and economic coercion
of employers, the actors’ unions require actors to be members
to get roles.230 However, actors have difficulty becoming
223

Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576.
See id. (“This same consideration underlies . . . copyright laws long
enforced by this Court.”); Coyne, supra note 6, at 813 (“Apparently, lurking beneath the
surface in both publicity right and copyright decisions is the notion that ‘protection
exists primarily not to benefit the artist, but rather to benefit the public by offering
artists economic incentives to create.’” (quoting Note, Human Cannonballs and the
First Amendment: Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 30 STAN. L. REV.
1185, 1192 (1978))).
225
Madow, supra note 3, at 213 (“A handful of ‘superstars’ command huge
audiences and huge incomes, while everybody else—including persons only slightly less
talented than the stars, or more talented and less lucky or ruthless—is ‘pushed to the
back’ and ‘unrewarded.’”).
226
Id. at 214 (“There is, first of all, the desire for fame itself: for renown, for
recognition, for glory, for liberation from powerless anonymity. There is the satisfaction of
realizing and exercising one’s talents, of developing and displaying proficiency at some
difficult or complicated activity. There is the pleasure of winning people’s applause,
inspiring their love or awe, earning their respect or gratitude.” (footnote omitted)).
227
See, e.g., Memorandum from Douglas J. Wood, Reed Smith LLP, on Unions & the
Prod. of Commercials for Traditional & Non-Traditional Media 3 (Jan. 28, 2009), available at
http://www.adlawbyrequest.com/uploads/file/Why%20be%20an%20Authorizer.pdf (“Without
doubt, union performers are the best professional and sought after performers for
commercials. They understand their craft and bring great efficiency to the workplace.”).
228
Chi, supra note 83, at 65-70.
229
Id. at 11.
230
Id. at 37-44.
224
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members of the actors’ unions.231 For example, there are only
three ways to become a member of SAG: to be cast in a SAG
production as a principal performer,232 to work as an extra on a
SAG production for three days,233 or to be a dues-paying
member of an equivalent acting union.234 But since the unions
control the supply of jobs in the industry, a non-union actor has
significant difficulty joining SAG.235 Therefore, the difference
between those that make it into the union and those that do
not becomes, in large part, a question of luck rather than
skill.236 Referencing the collective bargaining relationship here
provides further support for Professor Madow’s position that
the value of a personality in entertainment is not proportional
to the amount of the individual’s effort. This undercuts the
labor theory as a justification for the right of publicity and
questions the validity of any analogy to copyright.
B.

Diminution in Value and Trademark

Another common argument for the right of publicity is
that it protects against diminishment in the value of persona.
The right of publicity allows individuals to maximize upon the
value of their persona through licensing at a specified price-peruse, which ensures that advertisers to whom the persona is most
valuable will purchase it.237 However, “[u]nrestricted use of a
person’s name or likeness makes that name or likeness less scarce
and thus, less valuable,”238 which justifies a property protection.
This justification is analogous to trademark dilution under the
Lanham Act.239 Traditional trademark infringement requires proof
231

Id.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 41.
234
See id. (describing how SAG controls the extras in many productions and
how only a “small number of lucky extras may be assigned an ‘unscripted line’ while
they are on the set”).
235
Id.
236
Id. at 68 (“Due to the element of arbitrariness in the determination of which
actors become members of the union, the lack of regular . . . SAG-provided training to
ensure some basic level of skill and experience, and the uncertainty regarding the reasons
why producers have not substantially resisted union control over the acting labor
supply, . . . SAG [cannot] hold itself out as an expert arbiter of quality or talent.”).
237
Madow, supra note 3, 223 (summarizing Richard Posner’s argument).
238
Konsky, supra note 8, at 350.
239
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006) (“Subject to the principles of equity, the
owner of a famous mark that is distinctive, inherently or through acquired
distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction against another person who, at any
time after the owner’s mark has become famous, commences use of a mark or trade
name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by
tarnishment of the famous mark.”); see also Greene, supra note 2, at 532-33 (“The
232
233
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that the violator’s use creates consumer confusion.240 Trademark
dilution, an alternative theory, requires a showing that the mark
is famous and distinctive but requires no showing of consumer
confusion.241 Congress promulgated this section to protect famous
trademarks from diminishment in value by overuse, even when
the use causes no consumer confusion.242 Arguably, trademark
dilution is analogous to the right of publicity because both aim to
protect a commercially valuable intangible property from
diminishing in value. As a result, commentators often assert that
the right of publicity should be restricted by the same limits
placed on trademark dilution,243 which would require the mark to
be distinctive and famous.244
But rank-and-file actors in commercials also face
overexposure. An advertiser’s unrestricted use of a commercial
leads to the principal performer becoming associated with the
product. As a result, there is a risk that other advertisers will
not hire the performer for new commercials.245 The Commercials
Contracts address this overexposure problem with the
compensation scheme; holding fees and residuals compensate
principal performers proportional to the damage to their
images from overexposure.246
However, the Commercials Contracts also prove that
non-famous individuals have valuable personas. Performers
that receive contract-scale wages are not famous, as wellknown individuals command significantly higher wages
through overscale contracts.247 Additionally, unionized

overexposure theory is very close, if not identical, to a dilution-by-blurring
theory . . . . The theory underlying dilution is that, if the law permits willy-nilly use of
trademark, even if consumer confusion is evident, there is still harm to the markholder, who has invested goodwill in its mark . . . .”).
240
Konsky, supra note 8, at 354.
241
Id. (“Unlike a trademark infringement action, a trademark dilution action
can be brought in the absence of consumer confusion about the goods.”); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c)(1) (stating that plaintiff can seek injunction “regardless of the presence or
absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury”).
242
Konsky, supra note 8, at 354 (“Trademark dilution law is concerned with
protecting a trademark owner against uses that ‘whittle away’ the value of the mark,
diminishing its uniqueness.”).
243
Id. at 359 (“The current right of publicity should be replaced with a right of
publicity dilution, similar to trademark dilution law. A right of publicity dilution would
prohibit the most harmful uses of a person’s name or likeness without chilling valuable
commentary.”).
244
Id. at 355.
245
See supra note 207.
246
See supra notes 203-09 and accompanying text.
247
See Chi, supra note 83, at 21 (“Most of the members of these unions are
neither rich nor famous; it is only in the entertainment industry that huge disparities
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advertisers must pay union wages to everyone that appears as
a principal, including uncast individuals in reality situations.248
These uncast individuals are not well-known or famous, but
business practice still compensates them for damage to their
images through holding fees and residual payments. While the
diminution-in-value justification is an apt similarity between
trademark and right-of-publicity law, personalities are not
trademarks. Transplanting trademark dilution onto the right
of publicity discriminates against non-celebrities, as it would
protect only famous individuals despite the business practice of
compensating non-famous for damage to their personas.
C.

Unjust Enrichment

Courts and commentators often invoke an unjust
enrichment justification for the right of publicity. This
justification maintains that the law must protect individuals from
misappropriators.249 For example, the Supreme Court has stated
that “[t]he rationale for protecting the right of publicity is the
straight-forward one of preventing unjust enrichment by theft of
good will. No social purpose is served by having the defendant get
free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value
and for which he would normally pay.”250 Additionally, Judge
Holmes, dissenting in O’Brien, advocated for a right-of-publicitylike right251 because appropriation “is contrary to usage and
custom among advertisers in the marts of trade. They are
undoubtedly in the habit of buying the right to use one’s name or
picture to create demand and good will for their merchandise.”252
exist without limits between the salaries and overall market values of unionized
superstars and rank-and-file members.” (footnote omitted)).
248
See, e.g., PRINDLE, supra note 131, at 11 (“Many nonactors have joined
because, for example, they happened to become caught up in a ‘real people’ television
commercial while shopping at a supermarket one day, thereby earning the right to
acquire a SAG card.”). “Uncast” performers refer to principal performers under the
Commercials Contract who the producers select during the shooting of the commercial
rather than prior to the shooting through a casting process. For a description of how
advertisers utilize uncast performers in advertisements, see infra note 284.
249
Kwall, supra note 10, at 85 (“It is perhaps easiest to see the harm that the
presence of unjust enrichment engenders for the publicity plaintiff, and her relatives
and assignees, since they are being denied the value of the defendant’s gain by virtue of
the unauthorized appropriation.”).
250
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 563, 576 (1977) (quoting
Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law: Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966)) (brackets omitted).
251
O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1942) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
252
Id. at 171.
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Residual payments provide an apt analogy to the unjust
enrichment justification for the right of publicity. The unions
demanded residual payments in response to the emergence of
new technology that allowed reproduction of actors’
performances.253According to the union, compensation for the
reuse of the broadcast was fair because the technology
distributed its members’ performances for free when consumers
would customarily pay for them.254 Therefore, the residuals
compensate performers for the unjust enrichment that
advertisers receive from reusing advertisements, as the
industry has historically compensated actors for each
performance. After referencing the business custom, the unjust
enrichment justification is persuasive. This conclusion affirms
that the right of publicity has a theoretically grounded purpose
within our jurisprudence. Additionally, it suggests that when
analyzing the doctrine within the right of publicity, the right
should be approached from an unjust enrichment angle rather
than a quasi-copyright or trademark.
D.

Natural Rights Theory

Advocates for the right of publicity justify it by arguing
control over persona is an innate and natural right. Infringing
on the right of publicity damages more than the commercial
value of the persona; it also takes away the individual’s natural
right to control the use of their persona.255 Professor McCarthy,
for one, argues that “[p]erhaps nothing is so strongly intuited
as the notion that my identity is mine—it is my property to
control as I see fit. Those who are critical of this principle
should have the burden to articulate some important
countervailing social policy which negates this natural impulse
of justice.”256 Professor Haemmerli draws upon the philosophy of
Immanuel Kant to intellectually strengthen the natural rights
justification for the right of publicity.257 Haemmerli concludes,
253

See supra Part I.C. For example, in radio, the unions negotiated for
residuals following the radio stations’ shift from having actors perform in each time
zone to replaying the same recorded broadcast in each time zone. See supra notes 14854 and accompanying text.
254
See supra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
255
See, e.g., Haemmerli, supra note 9, at 385-86 (“The right of publicity can
also be viewed as a property right grounded in human autonomy. As such, it belongs to
all, . . . and it embraces noneconomic objections to the commercial exploitation of
identity.” (footnote omitted)).
256
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:1.
257
Haemmerli, supra note 9, at 416.
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“The central concept of autonomy in Kantian philosophy could
lend itself to a philosophical justification of a right of publicity.
Autonomy implies the individual’s right to control the use of
her own person, since interference with one’s person is a direct
infringement of the innate right of freedom . . . .”258
Analyzing a natural rights justification from the
perspective of a consensual agreement seems counterintuitive.
However, the Commercials Contracts provide some support for
the natural rights justification. When the performer agrees to
appear in a specific commercial, the Commercials Contracts
allow advertisers discretion over when, where, and how much
the advertisement will run, like a property rule;259 yet, the
advertiser has to compensate the performer for its usage, which
acts as a liability rule.260 When the producer extends the
performer’s use beyond the agreed-upon terms by using the
performer in a new commercial, the performer can prevent the
use by going through arbitration or the judicial process.261
Therefore, the idea that performers have an innate right to
control their personas pervades even collective bargaining
agreements in entertainment. The natural rights justification
reinforces the unjust enrichment justification as well: rather
than efficiently allocating property—like copyright or
trademark—the right of publicity promotes fairness for
individuals whose identities are misappropriated. Thus, the
rules within the right of publicity ought to operate as natural
property rights that prevent unjust enrichment.
IV.

EVALUATING DOCTRINAL RULES WITHIN THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY

The Commercials Contracts provide a point of reference
to evaluate how the right of publicity actually operates within
the law. Specifically, this part will analyze the underlying
assumptions of rules that operate within the right-of-publicity
jurisprudence by paralleling the rules to business practice, as
seen through the Commercials Contracts.

258
259
260
261

Id.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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Right of Publicity to Non-Celebrities

The question of whether the right of publicity extends to
non-celebrities is the most apparent division between
jurisdictions. Because the right of publicity evolved out of
celebrities’ struggles to recover under the right of privacy, the
question of whether non-celebrities could recover for
appropriation of commercial value of their personalities has
divided both courts and commentators. The bulk of
jurisdictions recognize a cause of action for individuals who are
not famous personalities.262 These jurisdictions follow Melville
B. Nimmer’s principle:
It is impractical to attempt to draw a line as to which persons have
achieved the status of celebrity and which have not; it should rather
be held that every person has the property right of publicity, but
that damages which a person may claim for infringement of the right
will depend upon the value of the publicity appropriated which in
turn will depend in great measure upon the degree of fame attained
by the plaintiff.263

262

See, e.g., Bowling v. Missionary Servants of the Most Holy Trinity, No. 915920, 1992 WL 181427, at *5 (6th Cir. July 20, 1992) (holding that under Kentucky
common law a non-celebrity has a right of publicity cause of action); Motschenbacher v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 825 n.11 (9th Cir. 1974) (recognizing in dicta
that under California common law non-celebrities have a cause of action for the right of
publicity); Fanelle v. Lojack Corp., No. CIV.A. 99-4292, 2000 WL 1801270, at *11 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 7, 2000) (“I am convinced that the right of publicity resides in every person,
not just famous and infamous individuals.”); KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr.
2d 713, 722 n.12 (Cal. 2d. Dist. 2000) (“In our view, determining preemption of a
plaintiff’s section 3344 claim on the basis of the plaintiff’s celebrity status would be
violative of California law. Under California law, the statutory right of publicity exists
for celebrity and non-celebrity plaintiffs alike.”); Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 790, 792 n.2 (Cal. 2d. Dist. 1993) (recognizing in dicta that under California
common law non-celebrities have a cause of action for the right of publicity); Martin
Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d
697, 703 (Ga. 1982) (concluding that the right of publicity exists “whether the person
whose name and likeness is used is a private citizen, entertainer, or as here a public
figure who is not a public official”); Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, 441
P.2d 141, 144 (Haw. 1968) (holding that there was a right of publicity cause of action
for a private citizen); Ainsworth v. Century Supply Co., 693 N.E.2d 510, 514 (Ill. App.
1998) (holding that the right of publicity extends to non-celebrities); Canessa v. J.I.
Kislak, Inc., 235 A.2d 62, 75 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1967) (“[I]t seems to us that
however little or much plaintiff’s likeness and name may be worth, defendant, who has
appropriated them for his commercial benefit, should be made to pay for what he has
taken . . . .”); Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 473 N.Y.S.2d 426, 431 (N.Y. App.
Div.1984) (“The legislative protection is clear, extending to ‘any person’ within the
general public, not merely to those with a publicly identifiable feature . . . .”); see also 1
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 4:14 (“[T]he majority of commentators and courts hold that
everyone, celebrity and noncelebrity alike, has a right of publicity.”).
263
Nimmer, supra note 127, at 217.
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These jurisdictions presume that the non-famous
individual’s persona has commercial value based upon the
defendant’s usage in a way that exploits the persona for
commercial benefit.264 This standard comports to the unjust
enrichment and natural rights justifications: the advertiser
receives the plaintiff’s image without his or her consent, which
violates the non-famous person’s natural rights.265 And the
advertiser would normally pay for such services, which
suggests unjust enrichment.266 The question of the value of the
plaintiff’s persona only becomes a factor when determining
compensatory damages. Although the amount of compensatory
damages may be insignificant when a non-celebrity is
commercially exploited, many states permit right-of-publicity
plaintiffs to disgorge profits267 and recover punitive damages
from misappropriators.268 For example, in Christoff v. Nestle, a
jury awarded over $15 million dollars in profits to an unknown
model, who had been working as a kindergarten teacher, for
using his picture on coffee packaging.269
Other courts have refused to extend the right of
publicity to individuals with unknown personas.270 Often these
264

1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 4:17 (“The courts use the commonsense rule
that if defendant uses plaintiff’s personal identity for commercial purposes, then it will
be presumed that plaintiff’s identity had commercial value. This presumption is similar
to a presumption well established in trademark law.”).
265
Many commentators endorse, at least in theory, a broad right of publicity
that applies to everyone because of natural rights theory. See Greene, supra note 2, at
538 (“[D]enying a publicity claim to a non-celebrity discounts personality rationales of
personhood . . . . Arguments against non-celebrity right of publicity claims, regardless of
merit, in effect value commercial speech over rights of personhood.” (footnote omitted));
see also Goodman, supra note 4, at 249 (“[T]he right of publicity must protect all persons
and must not become a special interest right for celebrities only.”); Kwall, supra note 10,
at 55-56 (“This Author believes that the right of publicity has the potential for
safeguarding from unauthorized use any marketable and publicly recognizable attribute
of any individual, regardless of whether that person is a celebrity.”); James M. Treece,
Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal Histories, 51 TEX. L. REV.
637, 648 (1973) (“[A] non-celebrity can argue, if he chooses, that an advertising use of his
personality has unlawfully invaded an economic interest.”).
266
See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
267
2 MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 11:34 (“In the analogous areas of trademark
and copyright infringement, recovery of the profits made by defendant from the
infringing sales are a standard form of monetary recovery.”).
268
Id. § 11:36 (“Under the law of most states, punitive or exemplary damages
may be obtained in privacy and publicity suits.”).
269
Christoff v. Nestle, Inc., 213 P.3d 132, 133-34 (Cal. 2009). The Supreme
Court of California later overturned the verdict because the statute of limitations
barred plaintiff’s claim, unless the plaintiff could show that the defendant had
hindered the plaintiff’s discovery of the unauthorized use of his likeness. Id. at 134.
270
See, e.g., Vassiliades v. Garfinckel’s, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 592 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (holding that the plaintiff had no cause of action because her likeness lacked
value); Pesina v. Midway Mfg. Co., 948 F. Supp. 40, 42 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (“The plaintiff
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courts require proof that a plaintiff’s personality has objective
value outside of the alleged commercial use. For example, in
Cheatham v. Paisano Pub., Inc., the court developed a
threshold test to determine whether a plaintiff’s identity has
commercial value:271 “Commercial value may be established by
proof of (1) the distinctiveness of the identity and by (2) the
degree of recognition of the person among those receiving the
publicity.”272 Courts that follow this reasoning reject the
presumption that the commercial exploitation by a defendant
proves that a plaintiff’s persona has value.
Several commentators have supported denying the right
of publicity to non-celebrities.273 In particular, those who
advocate for a trademark-dilution analogy assert that the right
of publicity should not protect non-celebrities because
trademark law does not protect unknown marks.274 Others
argue that the First Amendment bars non-celebrity right-ofpublicity claims.275 For instance, Alicia Hunt argues that
protecting the right of publicity for celebrities is a state interest
substantial enough to pass the First Amendment’s protection of
claiming the infringement of this right must show that, prior to the defendant’s use,
the plaintiff’s name, likeness, or persona had commercial value.”); Cheatham v.
Paisano Pub., Inc., 891 F. Supp. 381, 386 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (ruling that plaintiffs must
prove commercial value to establish a right of publicity claim); Barnako v. Foto Kirsch,
Ltd., Civ. A. No. 86-1700, 1987 WL 10230, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 1987) (“[T]he plaintiff
must allege, and later prove, that the defendant’s commercial benefit was derived from
the identity of the plaintiff and the value or reputation which the public associates
with that identity.”); Jackson v. Playboy Enters., 574 F. Supp. 10, 13 (S.D. Ohio 1983)
(“[T]he complaint must allege that plaintiff’s name or likeness has some intrinsic value,
which was taken by defendant for its own benefit, commercial or otherwise.”); Ali v.
Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (suggesting in dicta that the right
of publicity may not extend to non-celebrities under New York’s right to privacy
statute); Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 564 (Utah 1988) (“[T]he complaint fails because it
must allege that the plaintiffs’ names or likenesses have some ‘intrinsic value’ that was
used or appropriated for the defendants’ benefit.” (citing Jackson, 574 F. Supp. at 13)).
271
Cheatham, 891 F. Supp. at 386.
272
Id.
273
See, e.g., Howard I. Berkman, Note, The Right of Publicity—Protection for
Public Figures and Celebrities, 42 BROOK. L. REV. 527, 533 (1976) (“In a suit grounded
upon the commercial appropriation of a private individual’s name or picture, the correct
measure of damages is the extent of injury to the individual’s feelings and not the value
that the defendant received from the unauthorized use of his name or picture.”).
274
See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 5, at 1166 (“Doctrinally, such an approach
would limit the right to circumstances in which the use of an individual’s name or
likeness in connection with the sale of a product is likely either to confuse consumers or
to dilute the significance of a famous name.”); Konsky, supra note 8, at 366-70 (arguing
for a requirement that the plaintiff be distinct and famous in order to recover for the
right of publicity).
275
See, e.g., Hunt, supra note 23, at 1609 (“The extension of the right of
publicity to noncelebrities is disturbing because in many instances, it interferes with
the First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech.”).
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commercial speech, but that the interest in protecting the right
of publicity of non-celebrities is not substantial enough.276 Under
the Central Hudson277 precedent, the standard for determining
if restrictions on commercial speech violate the First
Amendment, “the government may restrict truthful and
nonmisleading commercial speech only if it proves (1) it has a
substantial state interest in regulating speech, (2) the
regulation directly and materially advances the interest, and
(3) the regulation is no more extensive than necessary to serve
that interest.”278 Hunt concludes that the non-celebrities’ rights
of publicity are not substantial under the test because noncelebrities’ identities have no provable economic value.279 Hunt
questions the legitimacy of the presumption that noncelebrities have commercial value based on the manner that
the infringer uses their persona, suggesting that the
commercial value of non-famous people does not change by
overuse.280
Business practice under the Commercials Contracts
sheds some light on this issue. In particular, business practice
is integral to determine the rationality of the legal presumption
that personas of non-celebrities have commercial value when
commercially exploited. Undoubtedly, anyone working in a
commercial under the union scale could hardly be considered
Nonetheless,
these
individuals
receive
“famous.”281
276

Id. at 1639-52.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557 (1980). Various members of the Supreme Court have at times questioned the
continued application of the Central Hudson standard. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518-19 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that in
cases of restrictions on truthful commercial speech, Central Hudson balancing test
should be replaced by per se violation of the First Amendment); id. at 517 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (expressing “discomfort with the Central Hudson test, which seems to me
to have nothing more than policy intuition to support it”); see also Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011) (holding that content based restrictions on
commercial speech receive heightened scrutiny rather than applying the balancing test
established by Central Hudson).
278
Hunt, supra note 23, 1619-20.
279
Id. at 1643 (“[I]t is unlikely that the government’s interest would be
‘substantial’ in cases involving private individuals with no level of fame, notoriety or
goodwill attached to their identities. In these cases, the commercial value is merely
‘presumed,’ even though there is no evidence that the identity in fact has any
commercial value.”).
280
Id. at 1643-44.
281
“Union scale” refers to the minimum payments allowable under the
Commercials Contracts. Commercial producers generally pay famous actors above the
union scale. See Prindle, supra note 139, at 14 (“Before starting on a project, stars
would have had their agents negotiate a work agreement much more favorable to
themselves than is the standard SAG contract.”).
277
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compensation for loss in the commercial value of their personas
through residual payments. On the other hand, there may be
an argument that an actor who consistently works under the
Commercials Contracts has a persona with proven commercial
value, and therefore passes the “intrinsic value” threshold. In
commercials made under the Commercials Contracts, which
make up 90 percent of all commercials made in the United
States,282 all performers must be paid at least the union wage.283
If the advertiser uses uncasted performers in its commercials,
those performers must also be paid at least the union scale—
advertisers will on occasion pay residuals to anonymous
individuals who are not professional actors.284 Therefore,
advocates for a non-celebrity right are supported by industry
practice in paying residuals to non-celebrities in the
contractual setting.
B.

Incidental Use Exception for Fleeting and Insignificant Use

Another doctrinal rule within the right of publicity that
could be shaped by reference to the Commercials Contracts is
the incidental use exception for fleeting and insignificant use.
Seemingly every state that recognizes the right of publicity
makes an exception to liability when the use is fleeting or
insignificant.285 The straightforward reason for this exception is
282

Neff, supra note 167.
See SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, at Sch. B, § I(A)-(C)
(requiring all principal performers to join the union within 30 days after hire in order
to work on a union production); AFTRA Commercials Contract, supra note 165, at Sch.
B, § I(A)-(C) (same); SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, at Sch. D, § 6(a)
(setting forth minimum compensation for all extras on unionized productions);
Commercials Contract, supra note 165, at Sch. C, § 2(a) (same).
284
See, e.g., PRINDLE, supra note 131, at 93 (“[A]dvertising agencies had fallen
into the habit of using ‘real people’ in their TV commercials. Once they had appeared
on screen, these nonprofessionals were eligible for a SAG card, which many of them
acquired for its prestige value. No one in the guild knew how many members were thus
nonactors, but there was widespread agreement that they swelled the membership lists
without adding to the talent pool.”).
285
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(e) (West 1997) (“[I]t shall be a question of
fact whether or not the use of the person’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness was so directly connected with the commercial sponsorship or with the paid
advertising as to constitute a use for which consent is required.”); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 540.08(3)(c) (West 2007) (mandating that the right of publicity does not apply to
“[a]ny photograph of a person solely as a member of the public and where such person
is not named or otherwise identified in or in connection with the use of such
photograph”); NEB. REV. ST. § 20-202(3) (2007) (mandating that the right of publicity
does not apply to “[a]ny photograph of a person solely as a member of the public when
such person is not named or otherwise identified in or in connection with the use of
such photograph”); OKL. ST. ANN. tit. 12, § 1449(e) (West 2010) (“[I]t shall be a question
of fact whether or not the use of the person’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or
283
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that, in these cases, the individual’s persona is not being
exploited commercially.286 Additionally, courts do not want to
overburden expression by exposing parties to liability when an
individual incidentally appears in media.287
New York has the most developed incidental use
doctrine. A court first invoked the incidental use doctrine in
1915, under the right-to-privacy statute (which today also
protects the right of publicity), in Merle v. Sociological
Research Film Corp.288 There, the court ruled that a glimpse of
the plaintiff’s business sign in defendant’s movie did not violate
right-to-privacy law.289 Specifically, the court held that for there
to be a violation under the right-to-privacy statute, “it must
appear that the use of the plaintiff’s picture or name is itself for
the purpose of trade and not merely an incidental part of a
photograph.”290 The New York Court of Appeals in Gautier v.
Pro-Football Company established a clear precedent when a
defendant’s use of plaintiff’s name or likeness is incidental. In
Gautier, the plaintiff was an animal trainer who performed
during the half-time show for a professional football team.291
The defendant broadcasted part of the plaintiff’s performance
without the plaintiff’s express consent.292 The plaintiff filed a
right-of-publicity-like claim under the privacy statute and
claimed that the defendant appropriated his image for
commercial purposes because advertisements aired during the
broadcast.293 The court ruled that the defendant’s use of the
plaintiff’s image was incidental because the use was not
likeness was so directly connected with the commercial sponsorship or with the paid
advertising as to constitute a use for which consent is required.”); Brown v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., 799 F. Supp. 166, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Gautier v. Pro-Football,
Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485, 488-89 (N.Y. 1952); Vinci v. Am. Can Co., 591 N.E.2d 793, 794 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1990); Henley v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, 46 F. Supp. 2d 587, 590 (N.D. Texas 1999);
Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 563 (Utah 1988); Staruski v. Cont’l Tel. Co. of Vt., 581 A.2d
266, 270 (Vt. 1990); Town & Country Props., Inc. v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356, 363 (Va.
1995).
286
See Aligo v. Time-Life Books, Inc., No. C 94-20707 JW, 1994 WL 715605, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 1994) (“The rationale for this rule is that an incidental use has
no commercial value.”).
287
See Preston v. Martin Bergman Prods., Inc. 765 F. Supp. 116, 120 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (“The doctrine of incidental use was developed to address concerns that penalizing
every unauthorized use, no matter how insignificant or fleeting, of a person’s name or
likeness would impose undue burdens on expressive activity, and carry consequences
which were not intended by those who enacted the statute.”).
288
Merle v. Sociological Research Film Corp., 152 N.Y.S 829 (App. Div. 1915).
289
Id. at 831-32.
290
Id. at 832.
291
Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485, 487 (N.Y. 1952).
292
Id.
293
Id.
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directly related to the commercial purpose of the
advertisement.294 The court reasoned that the plaintiff “was not
connected with the product either by visual, oral or other
reference, nor was any issue of fact created by the physical
juxtaposition of the [commercial] prior to his performance.”295
Consequently, the dispositive question under the Gautier
decision is whether defendant’s use of plaintiff’s persona
directly connects with plaintiff’s advertising or trade purpose.
With varying results, New York continues to follow the
Gautier test to determine incidental use today. Often this test
leads to fair results, for instance when it is clear that the
defendant’s usage does not exploit the plaintiff’s persona.296
However, courts have ruled usage incidental when a plaintiff’s
name or likeness clearly helped the defendant advertise.297
Given the factual nature of the incidental use doctrine, courts
often leave the question to juries.298
California’s right-of-publicity statute requires the plaintiff
to be identifiable in pictures299 and exempts liability when the
individual is part of a group where he or she is “represented in the
photograph solely as a result of being present at the time the
photograph was taken and have not been singled out as
individuals in any manner.”300 Additionally, California has a
common law incidental use doctrine, which follows New York’s
jurisprudence.301 In Aligo v. Time-Life, Books Inc., the court set out
a test for determining when use is incidental:
A number of factors are relevant in this regard: (1) whether the use
has a unique quality or value that would result in commercial profit
to the defendant, (2) whether the use contributes something of
significance, (3) the relationship between the reference to the
294

Id. at 488.
Id.
296
See, e.g., Candelaria v. Spurlock, No. 08 Civ. 1830, 2008 WL 2640471, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. July 3, 2008) (holding that the four second appearance of a fast food worker
in a documentary about fast food was incidental).
297
See, e.g., D’Andrea v. Rafla-Demetrious, 972 F. Supp. 154, 157-58
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that the defendant’s usage in a hospital brochure of a picture
of the plaintiff working in a hospital was incidental because it did directly convey
information about the hospital).
298
See Doe v. Darien Lake Theme Park & Camping Resort, Inc., 715 N.Y.S.2d
825, 825-26 (App. Div. 2000) (ruling that incidental use is a question for the jury).
299
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(b)(1) (West 1997) (“A person shall be deemed to be
readily identifiable from a photograph when one who views the photograph with the
naked eye can reasonably determine that the person depicted in the photograph is the
same person who is complaining of its unauthorized use.”).
300
Id. § 3344(b)(3).
301
See, e.g., Aligo v. Time-Life Books, Inc., No. C 94-20707 JW, 1994 WL
715605, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 1994).
295
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plaintiff and the purpose and subject of the work, and (4) the
duration, prominence or repetition of the name, or likeness relative
to the rest of the publication.302

The Commercials Contracts, and collective bargaining in
the entertainment industry more generally, provide an apt basis
for comparison to evaluate the rationality of the incidental use
doctrine. Specifically, the divide between principal performers
and extras in the Commercials Contracts mirror the incidental
use doctrine. Principal performers receive residual compensation
and holding fees for the usage of their personas;303 advertisers
pay extras only session fees and no residuals or holding fees.304
Therefore, an advertiser’s use of extras is analogous to
unauthorized incidental usage: neither requires compensation
for commercial exploitation of an individual’s persona.
Historically, the entertainment industry treated acting
and extra work as two completely different trades. SAG and
AFTRA represented actors and performer; the Screen Extras
Guild (SEG) represented extras.305 For example, the National
Labor Relations Board excluded from an extras union’s
jurisdiction individuals who performed more than extra work,
including stunts, singing, or performances involving lines.306
The decision explains, “all work before the motion picture
camera falls primarily in two main classes, the one being
known as acting work . . . and the other being known as extra
work . . . customarily described in the industry as atmospheric
or background work.”307 Although SEG disbanded in 1992 and
SAG acquired SEG’s former jurisdiction,308 there is a historical
norm of separating principal performers from extras.
This norm is readily apparent in the Commercials
Contracts. The contracts provide a general definition of a
principal performer in a television commercial: “Anyone who is
seen and who speaks a line or lines of dialogue . . . .”;309
302

See id. at *3 (citations omitted).
See supra notes 190-95 and accompanying text.
304
See SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, at sch. D, § 6; AFTRA
Commercials Contract, supra note 165, sch. C, § 2.
305
Television and Movie Agreement—Collective Bargaining Agreement; Screen
Actors Guild, American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, Alliance of Motion
Picture and Television Producers, MONTHLY LABOR REV. (Aug. 1992), http://findarticles.com/
p/articles/mi_m1153/is_n8_v115/ai_12624085/.
306
In re R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 61 N.L.R.B. 112 (1945).
307
Id. at 113.
308
Television and Movie Agreement, supra note 305.
309
SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 6(A); AFTRA Commercials
Contract, supra note 165, § 6(A)(1).
303
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“[a]nyone whose face appears silent, alone in a stationary
camera shot, and is identified with the product . . . .”310; or
“[a]nyone whose face appears silent and is identifiable and
whose foreground performance demonstrates or illustrates a
product or service, or illustrates or reacts to the on- or offcamera narration or commercial message.”311 The contracts treat
performers not within the general definition of the principal
performer as extras,312 with several exceptions for, among other
things, close-ups,313 stunt performers,314 dancers,315 and off-camera
voice usage.316 The detailed distinction between a principal
performer and an extra provides a framework to determine
when a television commercial uses an individual’s persona.
The division between principal performers and extras
leads to two observations about the right of publicity. First, it
demonstrates that the connection between the advertising
purpose and the individual’s part within the commercial affect
whether the individual will receive compensation for reuse of
persona. This can be seen in the definition of a principal
performer within the Commercials Contracts for “foreground
performance [that] demonstrates or illustrates a product or
service or illustrates or reacts to the on or off-camera narration
or commercial message.”317 This standard parallels Gautier’s
directly-related-to-the-advertising-or-trade-purpose standard
for incidental use in a right-of-publicity case.
Second, the Commercials Contracts present a reference
point for courts to use when determining if an unauthorized
appropriation of identity is incidental in a television
commercial. Courts should find unauthorized use—and not
incidental use—in a commercial that qualifies as principal
310

SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 6(B); AFTRA Commercials
Contract, supra note 165, § 6(A)(2).
311
SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 6(C); AFTRA Commercials
Contract, supra note 165, § 6(A)(3).
312
SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 6(C) (“Persons appearing in the
foreground solely as atmosphere and not otherwise covered by the foregoing shall be deemed
extra performers.”); AFTRA Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 6(A)(4) (same).
313
SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 6(D); AFTRA Commercials
Contract, supra note 165, § 6(A)(4).
314
SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 6(F) (“Stunt performers
need not be identifiable per se; only the stunt performed need be identifiable.”); AFTRA
Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 6(A)(6) (same).
315
SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 6(G); AFTRA Commercials
Contract, supra note 165, § 6(A)(7).
316
SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 6(H); AFTRA Commercials
Contract, supra note 165, § 6(A)(8).
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SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 6(C); AFTRA Commercials
Contract, supra note 165, § 6(A)(3).
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performance under the Commercials Contracts. By referencing
the Commercials Contracts, courts gain an elaborate
benchmark when considering if the use is directly related to
the advertising or trade purpose.
Use of the Commercials Contracts in this context is easy to
apply. For example, in Pooley v. National Hole-in-One Ass’n, the
plaintiff won a million dollars from the defendant for hitting a
hole-in-one in a competition.318 The defendant used six seconds of
footage of the plaintiff winning the competition without the
plaintiff’s consent during an eight-minute infomercial advertising
the defendant’s services.319 Although the plaintiff appeared only
briefly, his appearance was integral to the infomercial, as he was
the only winner of the defendant’s competitions. The court found,
applying the Aligo standard, that the incidental use doctrine did
not apply.320 Under the Commercials Contracts, the plaintiff’s part
within the infomercial would qualify him as a principal
performer. The plaintiff’s “face appear[ed]” and his “foreground
performance demonstrate[d] or illustrate[d]” the defendant’s
service, as he actually won the contest.321
CONCLUSION
Courts and commentators should no longer automatically
look to other intellectual property rights or academic frameworks
when analyzing the right of publicity. Instead, with common
origins and analogous rights to the right of publicity, collective
bargaining agreements in entertainment provide an appropriate
tool to scrutinize both the substantive rules and policy
justifications for the right of publicity. Unjust enrichment and
natural rights justifications for the right of publicity are supported
by reference to the Commercials Contracts. Furthermore, the
Commercials Contracts favor extending the right of publicity to
non-celebrities. Finally, courts and lawmakers can import the
Commercials Contracts when analyzing whether an unauthorized
use of an individual’s image or persona is incidental.
The comparison to the Commercials Contracts is not
necessarily limited to these points. The right of publicity and
collective bargaining agreements both face the challenge of
318

Pooley v. Nat’l Hole-in-One Ass’n, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1109 (D. Ariz. 2000).
Id. at 1110-11.
320
Id. at 1113 (“There is nothing, however, insignificant about the use of
Plaintiff’s name and footage in the videotape. His name, while only briefly mentioned,
prominently stands out as the highlight of Defendant’s advertisement.”).
321
See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
319
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adapting to rapidly changing technology.322 When faced with these
new technologies, looking to how collective bargaining agreements
have dealt with these new obstacles may be the best way to shape
the right of publicity in a rational manner going forward.
†
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Compare Anthony L. Pessino, Note, Mistaken Identity: A Call to Strengthen
Publicity Rights for Digital Personas, 4 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 86 (2004) (arguing that
new uses of digital technology necessitate strengthening the right of publicity), with
Craig J. Ackermann, E-Issues Take Center Stage: The 2000 SAG/AFTRA Strike, 8
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 293 (2002) (describing how labor disputes within
entertainment collective bargaining all relate to advances in technology).
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